The Bounds of Energy Law by Welton, Shelley
Boston College Law Review 
Volume 62 Issue 7 Article 5 
10-26-2021 
The Bounds of Energy Law 
Shelley Welton 
University of South Carolina School of Law, swelton@law.sc.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr 
 Part of the Energy and Utilities Law Commons, Environmental Law Commons, Law and Economics 
Commons, Law and Race Commons, and the Law and Society Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Shelley Welton, The Bounds of Energy Law, 62 B.C. L. Rev. 2339 (2021), 
https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol62/iss7/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College 
Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital 
Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu. 
 
 2339 
THE BOUNDS OF ENERGY LAW 
SHELLEY WELTON 
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 2341 
I. A MATERIALIST ACCOUNT OF THE FIELD AND ITS FAILINGS ................................................ 2347 
A. New Energy Sources and Uses Emerge: 1850–1930 ........................................................ 2348 
B. New Deal Legal Gap-Filling and the Mid-Century Détente: 1930–1970............................ 2353 
C. The (Partial) Collapse of the Consensus: 1970–2000 ...................................................... 2357 
D. 1990s–2020: Energy Law Meets Climate Change, First Generation .............................. 2361 
II. THE CLIMATE CONVERSATION AND THE LIMITS OF  EXISTING ENERGY LAW ..................... 2366 
A. Energy Law and the Decarbonization Imperative ............................................................ 2368 
B. The End of the Energy Law Silo ....................................................................................... 2373 
III. PUSHING THE BOUNDS OF ENERGY LAW ............................................................................. 2382 
A. Politics and Power as Central to the Analysis ................................................................. 2383 
B. Race, Inequality, and Energy ........................................................................................... 2390 
C. A Deeper Materiality ....................................................................................................... 2395 




THE BOUNDS OF ENERGY LAW 
SHELLEY WELTON* 
Abstract: U.S. energy law was born of fossil fuels. Consequently, our energy law 
has long centered on the material and legal puzzles that bringing fossil fuels to 
market presents. Eliminating these same carbon-producing energy sources, howev-
er, has emerged as perhaps the most pressing material transformation needed in 
the twenty-first century—and one that energy law scholarship has rightfully em-
braced. Yet in our admirable quest to aid in this transformation, energy law 
scholars are largely writing into the field bequeathed to us, proposing changes 
that tweak, but do not fundamentally challenge, last century’s tools for managing 
the extraction, transport, and delivery of fossil fuels and electrons. The result, as 
this Article illustrates, is that we are coming up short in achieving the scale and 
scope of transformation necessary for planetary stability. The aim of this Article 
is to push U.S. energy law scholars to expand the bounds of the field in three di-
rections. First, to achieve durable policies that transform the energy system, this 
Article argues that we must orient more attention to institutions, politics, and 
power—rather than just substantive solutions—to revive the best of the early-
twentieth-century Progressive scholarly tradition. Second, as conversations 
around the Green New Deal and the relationship of Black Lives Matter to the en-
ergy system highlight, there is both a political and moral imperative to shed our 
disciplinary obsession with economic efficiency and integrate considerations of 
overlapping societal priorities—most pointedly, racism and inequality—into en-
ergy law and policy. Finally, we should expand our idea of what counts as “ener-
gy law” beyond the delivery of fossil fuels and electrons, to include a broader 
and deeper analysis of how energy is embedded and consumed within the econ-
omy and society. That means tracing and regulating the flow of energy beyond 
the point of delivery by examining means of reducing or eliminating fossil fuel 
consumption across aviation, shipping, automobility, housing, and agriculture. It 
also means turning our attention to how the law can help build modes of life that 
better align with a no-carbon future—a new line of inquiry that the Article calls 
“structural energy conservation.” 
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INTRODUCTION 
As a field, energy law contains strikingly limited tools for dealing with 
the major crises of our time. For example, the COVID-19 pandemic tearing 
through the United States has proven particularly devastating in the Navajo 
Nation in large part because many homes there still lack electricity and indoor 
plumbing.1 U.S. energy law has essentially nothing to say regarding these con-
tinued disparities in access. COVID-19 also prompted many states to rush 
through new laws prohibiting electricity shutoffs during the rapid economic 
contraction and widespread lockdowns of 2020.2 Without these emergency pro-
tections, energy law would have permitted shutoffs to surge among the same 
communities of color most impacted by the virus. By October 2020, however, 
protections had expired for at least seventy-six million Americans, and today, 
most states again “have no binding protections from utility shutoffs.”3 These 
policy decisions have devastating human consequences: a January 2021 study 
found that a full federal moratorium on utility disconnections from March to 
November 2020 might have reduced COVID-19 infections by 8.7% and 
COVID-19-related deaths by 14.8% across the United States.4 
When it comes to the longer-term crisis of climate change, the equity gaps 
in energy law are also enormous. Generally, wealthy Americans create more 
carbon pollution because they own larger homes, consume more luxury goods, 
and take more airplane flights than other Americans.5 This fact means that 
                                                                                                                           
1 Laurel Morales, Lacking Water and Electricity, Navajo COVID-19 Cases Surge, KJZZ (Apr. 7, 
2020), https://kjzz.org/content/1514251/lacking-water-and-electricity-navajo-covid-19-cases-surge 
[https://perma.cc/6PKW-T4LN]; see Warigia M. Bowman, Dikos Nitsaa’igii-19 (“The Big Cough”): 
Coal, Covid-19, and the Navajo Nation 9 (Aug. 30, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3686931 [https://perma.cc/KBS3-LLMD] (examining “how 
U.S. energy or mineral extraction policy—particularly regarding coal and uranium—has weakened 
Navajo health, and may have contributed to the Covid-19 infection crisis on Navajo” (footnote omit-
ted)). 
2 See GREER RYAN, CTR. FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, EXPIRING ELECTRICITY SHUTOFF BANS 
COULD LEAVE TWO-THIRDS OF STATES WITH NO BINDING PROTECTIONS BY JULY, 88% BY AUGUST 2 
(2020), https://www.biologicaldiversity.org/programs/energy-justice/pdfs/June-23-2020-Issue-Brief_
State-Moratoria-on-Electric-ShutOffs.pdf [https://perma.cc/49BS-LX92] (providing an overview of 
laws initiated by half the states during COVID-19 that prohibited electricity shutoffs for consumers). 
3 Id. at 1 (emphasis omitted); Michael J. Coren, Bans on Electricity Shutoffs for 76 Million Ameri-
cans Are Being Lifted, QUARTZ, https://qz.com/1896433/utility-shutoff-bans-for-76-million-americans-
are-being-lifted/ [https://perma.cc/ZBJ7-LYJK] (Sept. 2, 2020). 
4 Kay Jowers, Christopher Timmins, Nrupen Bhavsar, Qihui Hu & Julia Marshall, Housing Pre-
carity & the COVID-19 Pandemic: Impacts of Utility Disconnection and Eviction Moratoria on Infec-
tions and Deaths Across US Counties 1 (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 28394, 2021), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w28394 [https://perma.cc/GJ4S-SRWN]. 
5 TIM GORE, OXFAM INT’L, CONFRONTING CARBON INEQUALITY 7 (2020), https://oxfamilibrary.
openrepository.com/bitstream/handle/10546/621052/mb-confronting-carbon-inequality-210920-en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/K8QN-R4K4] (“[T]he top 10% richest households globally use around 45% of all 
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along with the growth of extreme income inequality has come the rise of ener-
gy inequality.6 Due to this increased inequality, much of our remaining carbon 
budget risks being “squandered to expand the consumption of the already rich, 
rather than to improve humanity.”7 Yet poor communities within the United 
States and globally will bear most of the devastating climate-related impacts of 
these emissions.8 Again, U.S. energy law has little to say about this disparity in 
personal energy consumption and its consequences. 
U.S. energy law has also struggled to adequately account for issues of 
structural power and inequality. Although energy law scholars over the past 
several decades have made admirable contributions to transitioning away from 
fossil fuels,9 to date we have not matched the pace, scale, or scope of the nec-
essary transformation.10 Fossil fuel interests continue to hold outsized sway in 
energy politics and regulation at the state and federal levels, blocking or weak-
ening many worthwhile reform ideas.11 
The present-day limitations of U.S. energy law are obvious to many out-
side the field, including to the numerous young activists who insist that U.S. 
                                                                                                                           
the energy linked to land transport, and around 75% of all energy linked to aviation, compared with 
just 10% and 5% respectively for the poorest 50%.” (footnote omitted)). 
6 Yannick Oswald, Anne Owen & Julia K. Steinberger, Large Inequality in International and In-
tranational Energy Footprints Between Income Groups and Across Consumption Categories, 5 NA-
TURE ENERGY 231, 232 (2020), https://www.nature.com/articles/s41560-020-0579-8.pdf [https://
perma.cc/5ALA-F7XQ]. Oxfam International calculates that between 1990 and 2015, the emissions of 
the top 1% rose three times faster than the emissions of the bottom half. GORE, supra note 5, at 2. 
7 Fiona Harvey, World’s Richest 1% Cause Double CO2 Emissions of Poorest 50%, Says Oxfam, 
THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 20, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/sep/21/worlds-
richest-1-cause-double-co2-emissions-of-poorest-50-says-oxfam [https://perma.cc/2PSF-RN83] (quot-
ing Tim Gore, head of policy, advocacy and research at Oxfam International). 
8 See generally S. Nazrul Islam & John Winkel, Climate Change and Social Inequality (U.N. 
Dep’t Econ. & Soc. Affs., Working Paper No. 152, 2017), https://www.un.org/esa/desa/papers/2017/
wp152_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/UCR7-4ZC3] (identifying three means by which the impact of 
climate change is especially worse for the poor, including by increased exposure to climate change, 
increased susceptibility to damage, and decreased ability to recover). 
9 See infra Part I, Section D (discussing the inroads energy law scholars have recently made and 
providing examples of innovative ideas). 
10 See infra notes 144–153 (describing the current climate crisis and outlining steps needed to ad-
dress the problem). 
11 See infra notes 155–161 (outlining the lobbying efforts of utility companies, the fossil fuel in-
dustry, and partisan groups to stymie climate change legislation). See generally MATTO MILDEN-
BERGER, CARBON CAPTURED (Sheldon Kamieniecki & Michael E. Kraft eds., 2020) (investigating 
domestic climate policy in a series of countries and arguing that the success of clean energy policies 
depends on institutional support); NAOMI ORESKES & ERIK M. CONWAY, MERCHANTS OF DOUBT: 
HOW A HANDFUL OF SCIENTISTS OBSCURED THE TRUTH ON ISSUES FROM TOBACCO SMOKE TO 
GLOBAL WARMING (2010) (charting the history of climate change denialism); LEAH CARDAMORE 
STOKES, SHORT CIRCUITING POLICY: INTEREST GROUPS AND THE BATTLE OVER CLEAN ENERGY 
AND CLIMATE POLICY IN THE AMERICAN STATES (2020) (examining clean energy policies in the 
United States and arguing that lobbying from fossil fuel interest groups is central to why these policies 
failed to gain or maintain traction). 
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leaders stop treating climate change as a technocratic problem that can be 
solved within existing legal frameworks and institutions. These activists are 
demanding that climate change be framed as part of a larger agenda of eco-
nomic and racial justice. To accomplish this goal, activists call for a Green 
New Deal (GND)—a federal infrastructure and investment initiative at the 
scale of the 1930s New Deal—to create integrated solutions to the challenges 
that Americans of color and working-class Americans face in trying to carve 
out secure livelihoods on an increasingly precarious planet.12 These demands 
are gaining traction in state legislatures13 and now in the White House, as Pres-
ident Joe Biden has credited the youth climate movement for helping shape a 
federal climate agenda that draws heavily from the GND.14 Nevertheless, mov-
ing this agenda from rhetoric to federal-level action remains a challenging task 
that will require careful, deliberate attention to both the substance and political 
economy of emerging legislative and executive reform proposals. 
Energy law and energy law scholarship in the United States have not ade-
quately embraced this new conversation. In the last few decades, scholarly in-
terest in the field of energy law has intensified, and an expanded number of 
law schools have begun offering the subject. The impetus for this increased 
interest is the challenge of ameliorating climate change and its many injustices, 
which has drawn a new generation of scholars and students to energy law. But, 
in speaking with colleagues, I know I am not alone in questioning the contours 
and bounds of this field. When I teach energy law—and as the content of lead-
ing energy law textbooks illustrates—it ends up a strange admixture of proper-
ty law, environmental law, constitutional doctrine, regulated industries, statuto-
ry interpretation, and administrative law.15 I have found that the only way to 
                                                                                                                           
12 See H.R. Res. 109, §§ 1–2, 116th Cong. (2019) (outlining the goals of the joint resolution and 
introducing the key framework for the GND). 
13 See David Roberts, New York Just Passed the Most Ambitious Climate Target in the Country, 
VOX, https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2019/6/20/18691058/new-york-green-new-deal-
climate-change-cuomo [https://perma.cc/6BGP-Y9U7] (July 22, 2019); Justin Worland, California 
Already Has a Green New Deal. Here’s How It Works, TIME, https://time.com/5553039/green-new-
deal-california/ [https://perma.cc/5Q5F-ZA8X] (Mar. 29, 2019, 2:41 PM). 
14 See Adam Aton, Biden Vows Climate Action in First Speech as Nominee, E&E NEWS: CLI-
MATEWIRE (Aug. 21, 2020), https://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2020/08/21/stories/1063712211 
[https://perma.cc/36L2-DUHJ] (highlighting that youth represent powerful voices on economic, racial, 
and environmental injustice); Anand Giridharadas, To Solve Everything, Solve Climate, THE.INK 
(Anand Giridharadas, New York, N.Y.), Sept. 1, 2020, https://the.ink/p/to-solve-everything-solve-
climate [https://perma.cc/6Y5Q-WEQE] (outlining the impetus and goals of President Biden’s climate 
task force with Sunrise Movement executive director Varshini Prakash). 
15 See LINCOLN L. DAVIES, ALEXANDRA B. KLASS, HARI M. OSOFSKY, JOSEPH P. TOMAIN & 
ELIZABETH J. WILSON, ENERGY LAW & POLICY, at ix–x (2d ed. 2018) (organizing major sections by, 
inter alia, energy extraction, electricity governance, and energy transportation); JOEL B. EISEN, EMILY 
HAMMOND, JIM ROSSI, DAVID B. SPENCE, JACQUELINE L. WEAVER & HANNAH J. WISEMAN, ENER-
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organize this content coherently is to approach it materially, tracing energy 
physically as it moves through stages and spaces. For this reason, in my 
course, we first tackle energy extraction (mining, drilling, etc.), then energy 
generation (turning raw materials into electrons), then the movement of energy 
through space (transmission lines and pipelines), and then finally energy deliv-
ery (public utility law). 
This Article contends that U.S. energy law scholarship has similarly ori-
ented itself around the historic materiality of energy in ways that constrain the 
boundaries of the field.16 U.S. energy law was born of fossil fuels and its de-
velopment has been largely shaped by the material and legal puzzles associated 
with bringing these resources to consumers.17 Eliminating these same carbon-
producing energy sources, however, has emerged as perhaps the most pressing 
material transformation needed in the twenty-first century. Contemporary en-
ergy law scholarship embraces this challenge.18 Yet in the quest to aid in this 
transformation, energy law scholars are largely writing into the field be-
queathed to us by proposing changes that tweak, but do not fundamentally 
challenge, energy law’s supply-side, efficiency-oriented focus. Consequently, 
we are coming up short in achieving the scale and scope of transformation 
necessary for planetary stability. 
The aim of this Article is to push U.S. energy law scholars to expand the 
bounds of the field in three directions. First, to achieve durable policies that 
transform the energy system, the Article argues that we must reorient more 
attention to politics and power, rather than just substantive solutions, in a re-
vival of the best of the early-twentieth-century Progressive scholarly tradi-
tion.19 Second, there is both a political and moral imperative to shed the disci-
                                                                                                                           
GY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT, at ix (4th ed. 2015) (providing chapters on various sources 
of production, electricity regulation, and transportation). 
16 See ROBERT R. NORDHAUS & SAM KALEN, ENERGY FOLLIES: MISSTEPS, FIASCOS, AND SUC-
CESSES OF AMERICA’S ENERGY POLICY 2 (2018) (“[E]nergy law and regulation enjoy an iterative 
relationship with discrete events.”); Joseph P. Tomain, The Dominant Model of United States Energy 
Policy, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 355, 361 (1990) (“[T]he coal, oil, natural gas (and electricity) industries 
have been regulated separately by tracking each resource through its fuel cycle from production and 
processing through distribution and marketing.”). For a discussion of British Commonwealth energy 
law that takes a similar arc, see Raphael J. Heffron & Kim Talus, The Evolution of Energy Law and 
Energy Jurisprudence: Insights for Energy Analysts and Researchers, ENERGY RSCH. & SOC. SCI., 
Sept. 2016, at 1 (outlining the historical development of energy law to explain its current shape). 
17 See infra Part I (outlining the historical development of energy technology and energy law). Cf. 
Imre Szeman & Dominic Boyer, Introduction: On the Energy Humanities to ENERGY HUMANITIES 1 
(Imre Szeman & Dominic Boyer eds., 2017) (“We are citizens and subjects of fossil fuels through and 
through, whether we know it or not.”). 
18 See infra Part I, Section D (presenting recent articles from prominent energy law scholars). 
19 See Jedediah Britton-Purdy, David Singh Grewal, Amy Kapczynski & K. Sabeel Rahman, 
Building a Law-and-Political-Economy Framework: Beyond the Twentieth-Century Synthesis, 129 
YALE L.J. 1784, 1792 (2020) (arguing for a “law and political economy” approach to legal scholar-
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plinary obsession with economic efficiency and integrate considerations of 
overlapping societal priorities—most pointedly, racism and inequality—into 
energy law and policy. Finally, and relatedly, we should expand our idea of 
what counts as “energy law” beyond delivery of fossil fuels and electrons, to 
include a broader and deeper analysis of how energy is embedded and con-
sumed within the economy and society. This expansion must occur in at least 
two directions. First, we must trace and regulate the flow of energy beyond the 
point of delivery by examining means of reducing or eliminating fossil fuel 
consumption across aviation, shipping, automobility, housing, and agriculture. 
Second, we must ask how the law can help build modes of life that better align 
with a no-carbon future—a new line of inquiry that this Article terms “struc-
tural energy conservation.” 
These ideas share kinship with several budding intellectual movements. 
Several scholars have observed a convergence in the topics treated by energy 
and environmental law—a trend that drives my desire to reevaluate the con-
tours and content of energy law itself.20 Energy law scholars, with our focus on 
financing, siting, and delivering the benefits of key infrastructure, have a 
unique and valuable perspective to offer in discussions of decarbonization—
especially if we can better connect our corner of expertise to a broader set of 
societal conversations and movements. My goal here is to push for a reconcep-
tualization of the field that more thoroughly embraces the material challenge of 
climate change and under-addressed issues of power, politics, inequality, and 
racism that it inexorably implicates.21 Of course, energy is but one area of law 
                                                                                                                           
ship that proceeds from the understanding “that the economy is always already political in both its 
origins and its consequences”); K. Sabeel Rahman, Domination, Democracy, and Constitutional Polit-
ical Economy in the New Gilded Age: Towards a Fourth Wave of Legal Realism?, 94 TEX. L. REV. 
1329, 1332 (2016) (seeking to revive the Progressive concept of a “democratic political economy”). 
20 See, e.g., Todd S. Aagaard, Energy-Environment Policy Alignments, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1517, 
1518–20 (2015); Lincoln L. Davies, Alternative Energy and the Energy-Environment Disconnect, 46 
IDAHO L. REV. 473, 475–76 (2010); Jody Freeman, The Uncomfortable Convergence of Energy and 
Environmental Law, 41 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 339, 340 (2017); Alexandra B. Klass, Climate Change 
and the Convergence of Environmental and Energy Law, 24 FORDHAM ENV’T L. REV. 180, 182 
(2012). 
21 For other energy law scholars who have made inroads here, see generally Deborah Behles, 
From Dirty to Green: Increasing Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy in Environmental Justice 
Communities, 58 VILL. L. REV. 25 (2013) (equity-enhancing clean energy policy); Eric Biber, Culti-
vating a Green Political Landscape: Lessons for Climate Change Policy from the Defeat of Califor-
nia’s Proposition 23, 66 VAND. L. REV. 399 (2013) (California’s progressivity on climate issues); 
Eric Biber, Nina Kelsey & Jonas Meckling, The Political Economy of Decarbonization: A Research 
Agenda, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 605 (2017) (politics and power); William Boyd, Public Utility and the 
Low-Carbon Future, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1614 (2014) (possibilities for a broader understanding of 
public utility); Alice Kaswan, A Broader Vision for Climate Policy: Lessons from California, 9 SAN 
DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 83 (2018) (justice considerations); Felix Mormann, Clean Energy 
Equity, 2019 UTAH L. REV. 335, https://dc.law.utah.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1205&context=ulr 
[https://perma.cc/94NZ-HCFF] (incorporating equity); Uma Outka, Fairness in the Low-Carbon Shift: 
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that must be reckoned with, and I am indebted to the work of legal scholars 
across subject areas who are using this pivotal political moment to revisit these 
interrelationships within and across legal fields.22 
In developing this Article’s proposed expansions to energy law, I am also 
aided by the rich literatures that have developed in social science and the ener-
gy humanities regarding what the study of energy should encompass. As these 
literatures help illustrate, our understandings of what energy is and how we 
relate to it are as much cultural as scientific.23 The transformation of our ener-
gy system is therefore likely to require a far greater transformation of our-
selves and our institutions than energy law has contemplated to date. 
Many of the critiques leveled here at the narrowness of energy law schol-
arship also apply to energy policy-making as a whole, however, this Article 
focuses on legal scholarship for a key reason. As I see it, lawyers and policy-
makers on the ground can be forgiven and sometimes applauded for pursuing 
compromises and policies of expediency that secure incremental change. We 
are likely to see many reforms in this vein soon. The Biden Administration’s 
ambitious climate goals are already butting up against a bare Democratic ma-
jority in Congress, creating pressure for compromise measures that make mod-
est in-roads on climate change while reversing the worst of the Trump Admin-
istration’s deregulatory initiatives.24 Good, speedy lawyering will be critical in 
securing these important short-term changes. 
                                                                                                                           
Learning from Environmental Justice, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 789 (2017) (justice issues raised by clean 
energy transition); Shelley Welton & Joel Eisen, Clean Energy Justice: Charting an Emerging Agen-
da, 43 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 307 (2019) (similar clean energy justice issues). 
22 See generally MEHRSA BARADARAN, THE COLOR OF MONEY: BLACK BANKS AND THE RA-
CIAL WEALTH GAP (2017) (discussing racial wealth gap and banking); PAUL BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD: 
POLICING BLACK MEN (2017) (detailing how the legal system is set up against Black men); RICHARD 
ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGAT-
ED AMERICA (2017) (discussing history of racism in housing and land use policies); TIM WU, THE 
CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE (2018) (reframing antitrust as a field con-
cerned with “bigness” and political power, rather than just “consumer welfare”); Amna Akbar, 
Sameer M. Ashar, & Jocelyn Simonson, Movement Law, 73 STAN. L. REV. 821 (2021) (calling for 
more scholarship that works in tandem with social movements to open new avenues for justice); Mon-
ica C. Bell, Policing Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126 YALE L.J. 2054 (2017) 
(framing the problem of policing in Black communities as one of “legal estrangement”); Britton-
Purdy et al., supra note 19 (suggesting a framework for legal scholarship to focus on equality, power, 
and democracy); Rahman, supra note 19 (discussing ways to respond to inequality today); Ganesh 
Sitaraman, The Puzzling Absence of Economic Power in Constitutional Theory, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 
1445 (2016) (urging constitutional scholars to consider the politics of “elite economic domination”). 
23 See, e.g., Matthew Huber, Theorizing Energy Geographies, 9 GEOGRAPHY COMPASS 327, 328 
(2015) (“Energy underpins the basic aspects of social life—food, mobility, consumption, and the 
geographies of home and work.”). 
24 See Press Release, The White House Briefing Room, FACT SHEET: The American Jobs Plan  
(Mar. 31, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/31/fact-sheet-
the-american-jobs-plan/ [https://perma.cc/4U3X-APRA] (outlining the goals for the American Jobs 
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In contrast, energy law scholars—in our freer role as intellectuals—bear 
the burden and privilege of thinking bigger and bolder, asking how we can ad-
vance a set of durable reforms on par with the scale of the climate change cri-
sis rather than the political moment. This Article is an attempt to sketch a blue-
print in that direction and is intended to be an invitation for collaboration in the 
effort. Admittedly, the link between scholarship and action is at best slow and 
iterative and is often perceived as tenuous.25 But a better grounding of our 
scholarship in the present material reality of the planet, and the social reality of 
our times, should strengthen its potential as a catalyst for change. 
Because there is limited writing on the development of energy law as a 
legal field and scholarly discipline, Part I begins with a historical sketch of the 
topic as frequently conceptualized and taught to date.26 Part II then describes 
how climate change complicates the field of energy law both practically and 
intellectually, and thus demands a rapid transformation in our relationship to 
energy and to each other that reforms to date have been insufficient to 
achieve.27 Finally, Part III lays out my proposed expansions for the field, which 
build from the exigencies of responding to climate change rather than from the 
historical, material roots of the field.28 
I. A MATERIALIST ACCOUNT OF THE FIELD AND ITS FAILINGS 
Just what is energy law? In the latter part of the Article, I make the case 
for reimagining the contours and content of the field. But first, this Part 
sketches the history of energy law as typically, and more narrowly, conceived 
to date. 
                                                                                                                           
Plan); Geof Koss & Timothy Cama, Senate Inks Highway Deal as Parties Split on Broader Package, 
E&E NEWS: E&E DAILY (May 24, 2021), https://www.eenews.net/eedaily/2021/05/24/stories/1063
733303 [https://perma.cc/P583-UYMS] (describing how President Biden proposed $2.2 trillion in 
infrastructure spending in his March 2021 American Jobs Plan, but reduced the figure by May to $1.7 
trillion in an effort to achieve bipartisan compromise). Progressives have critiqued even the initial 
plan as considerably more tepid than President Biden’s campaign promises regarding infrastructure 
spending. Adam Aton, It’s Green and It’s New. But Biden’s Deal Aims for the Center, E&E NEWS: CLI-
MATEWIRE (Apr. 1, 2021), https://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2021/04/01/stories/1063729009 [https://
perma.cc/SMQ2-DNK9]. 
25 See, e.g., Pierre Schlag, Spam Jurisprudence, Air Law, and the Rank Anxiety of Nothing Hap-
pening (A Report on the State of the Art), 97 GEO. L.J. 803, 805–06 (2009). Activist-scholars might 
take perverse heart from recent work excavating the deep links between early scholars of neoliberal-
ism and the ongoing, multi-decade, largely successful political project they helped to spawn. See gen-
erally WENDY BROWN, IN THE RUINS OF NEOLIBERALISM: THE RISE OF ANTIDEMOCRATIC POLITICS 
IN THE WEST (2019); NANCY MACLEAN, DEMOCRACY IN CHAINS: THE DEEP HISTORY OF THE RADI-
CAL RIGHT’S STEALTH PLAN FOR AMERICA (2017); QUINN SLOBODIAN, GLOBALISTS: THE END OF 
EMPIRE AND THE BIRTH OF NEOLIBERALISM (2018). 
 26 See infra Part I. 
 27 See infra Part II. 
 28 See infra Part III. 
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This Part illustrates how energy’s material characteristics deeply inform 
energy law doctrine and scholarship. U.S. energy law is shaped around the par-
ticular characteristics of dominant energy sources as they emerge, rise, and 
sometimes fall.29 Thus, in the history of energy law, three energy sources fea-
ture centrally: oil, gas, and electricity––largely fired by coal, until recently. The 
arc of energy law devotes itself primarily to remedying evolving challenges in 
the production, transportation, and delivery of these fuels. This Part broadly 
outlines several of the field’s core theoretical and doctrinal developments and 
points out some of these developments’ limitations. Section A relates the emer-
gence of certain fuel sources and the birth of public utility companies.30 Section 
B delves into the New Deal and its implications for energy law.31 Section C dis-
cusses trends that emerged in the later part of the twentieth century, including the 
environmental movement and deregulation.32 Finally, Section D considers how 
the field has grappled so far with growing concern over climate change.33 
A. New Energy Sources and Uses Emerge: 1850–1930 
The birth of U.S. energy law can be traced to the late 1800s, the period 
when the country began extracting hydrocarbons from the earth in earnest to 
fuel rapid industrialization.34 Before this time, the nation was largely powered 
by hydropower and wood, with limited need for attendant legal doctrines.35 By 
the end of the nineteenth century, coal was the dominant fuel source in Ameri-
can industry and daily life.36 The oil and gas industries also emerged during 
                                                                                                                           
29 See, e.g., Kenneth A. Manaster, An Introductory Analysis of Energy Law and Policy, 22 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 1151, 1152–53 (1982) (suggesting that the development of energy law has proceeded 
fuel by fuel and controversy by controversy); Tomain, supra note 16, at 361 (providing an analysis of 
how energy policy has developed alongside each fuel’s development). Other scholars have made con-
cordant observations, albeit not necessarily with a critical slant. See Manaster, supra, at 1152–53; 
Tomain, supra note 16, at 361. 
 30 See infra Part I, Section A. 
 31 See infra Part I, Section B. 
 32 See infra Part I, Section C. 
 33 See infra Part I, Section D. 
34 See BARBARA FREESE, COAL: A HUMAN HISTORY 137 (2003) (describing transition from 
wood to coal between 1850 and 1900); William J. Novak, Law and the Social Control of American 
Capitalism, 60 EMORY L.J. 377, 379 (2010) (dating the emergence of modern capitalism to the period 
from 1877 to 1932); Tomain, supra note 16, at 355 (outlining how U.S. energy policy-makers have 
oriented the field towards efficiency since its inception); Hydrocarbon, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://
www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/hydrocarbon [https://perma.cc/AZJ9-TMFN] (defining 
hydrocarbons as “organic compound[s] . . . containing only carbon and hydrogen and often occur-
ring in petroleum, natural gas, coal, and bitumens”). 
35 NORDHAUS & KALEN, supra note 16, at 8, 11. During this time, Congress authorized dams on 
navigable waters through individual statutes. Id. 
36 See FREESE, supra note 34, at 137. 
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this same period, with the nation’s first commercial well drilled in 1859 in 
Pennsylvania.37 
These emerging fuels gave rise to new legal puzzles and doctrines. Some 
of the earliest legal battles revolved around property rights with disputes cen-
tered on who could lay claim to the new riches coming from underground. 
With coal––a rock that remains in place until removed by considerable labor–– 
these queries proved simple to answer under traditional notions of property. 
Coal mining, however, often left behind devastated landowners, whose land 
and homes could fissure, sink, and cave in once the support of underground 
coal stores was removed.38 The common law regarding such subsidence osten-
sibly protected surface landowners from collapses and other surface damage 
caused by mineral rights holders.39 In practice, however, enforcement of these 
rights proved difficult and courts tended to construe waivers of subjacent sup-
port liberally.40 Thus, as coal became king, landowners, neighbors, and labor-
ers found limited recourse in the law against its destructive potential.41 
For slippery oil and invisible gas, property doctrines proved more com-
plex because these fuels could migrate underground from one person’s proper-
ty to another’s when drilled.42 A new theory was necessary for these fossil 
fuels, and the solution state courts across the country struck upon was the “law 
of capture.”43 In brief, this doctrine holds that whoever captures oil or gas—
that is, has it in his possession by extracting it from the earth—owns it, even if 
                                                                                                                           
37 Owen L. Anderson, Foreword: The Evolution of Oil and Gas Conservation Law and the Rise 
of Unconventional Hydrocarbon Production, 68 ARK. L. REV. 231, 231–32 (2015). 
38 See Wendy B. Davis, Out of the Black Hole: Reclaiming the Crown of King Coal, 51 AM. U. L. 
REV. 905, 928 (2002) (describing subsidence as a phenomenon that occurs when the land sinks or 
shifts due to the removal of underlying coal). 
39 See Terrence O’Brien, Comment, Subsidence Regulation, 6 LAND & WATER L. REV. 543, 543–
44 (1971) (outlining the rights granted to the owner of a property from which coal is removed). 
40 See Robert E. Beck, Protecting the Public Interest or Surface Owners from Their Own Folly?: 
A Close Look at “Preventing” Subsidence Under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 
1977 (SMCRA), 21 S. ILL. U. L.J. 391, 398–99 (1997) (noting how courts gradually construed ever-
vaguer language as adequate waiver); Davis, supra note 38, at 917 (explaining how, “[a]fter selling 
their mineral rights for pennies,” surface land property owners were often surprised by the degree to 
which coal companies gained co-extensive rights to use and abuse the surface). 
41 See THOMAS G. ANDREWS, KILLING FOR COAL: AMERICA’S DEADLIEST LABOR WAR 87–156 
(2008) (detailing working conditions in turn-of-the-century coal mines); Davis, supra note 38, at 918–
19 (describing how coal operators were granted superior rights to surface owners by courts). 
42 D. Edward Greer, The Ownership of Petroleum Oil and Natural Gas in Place, 1 TEX. L. REV. 
162, 163 (1923) (discussing early cases differentiating oil and gas from “solid minerals”). 
43 See Note, Nature of A Landowner’s Right to Natural Gas, 7 HARV. L. REV. 369, 370 (1894) 
(outlining decisions that implicated the law of capture); Note, Rights of Access to Underlying Strata of 
the Earth’s Surface, 7 HARV. L. REV. 47, 47–48 (1893) (discussing cases regarding whether rights to 
coal also gave rights to underlying oil). 
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most of what was extracted originated under someone else’s land.44 And with 
that, the race to drill was on. 
Near the end of the nineteenth century, a new technology emerged that 
would revolutionize American domestic and industrial life: electricity.45 At 
first, the clamor to provide electricity caused a rush of competition between 
rival firms. Firms strung duplicative wires haphazardly across cities, compet-
ing to win local franchises and trying to cherry-pick the most lucrative cus-
tomers.46 Later, certain firms assumed dominant market shares, creating mo-
nopoly conditions that allowed the firms to exploit consumers.47 
These new material conditions forced an intense intellectual and practical 
legal battle over who should control the delivery of electricity, along with other 
key goods, and how.48 Some Progressive scholars advocated for municipal 
ownership of utilities that would each serve entire cities or regions.49 Other 
scholars called for the creation of state-level public utility commissions de-
signed to oversee and regulate the rates of private monopoly utilities.50 
The terms of this debate were much more public-oriented than were earli-
er battles over property rights. The theme animating these conversations was 
how best to tame the giant corporations that industrialization and agglomera-
                                                                                                                           
44 James W. Coleman, The Third Age of Oil and Gas Law, 95 IND. L.J. 389, 391 (2020); see 
Bruce M. Kramer & Owen L. Anderson, The Rule of Capture–An Oil and Gas Perspective, 35 ENV’T 
L. 899, 899 (2005) (describing the rule of capture as “an integral part of oil and gas law since the 
completion of the first commercial oil well”). Coleman describes how oil and gas leases were an im-
portant complementary legal development at this time. See Coleman, supra, at 401–06 (explaining 
how these leases spread the risk a productive or nonproductive well to the landowner and the oil com-
pany). 
45 See DAVID E. NYE, ELECTRIFYING AMERICA: SOCIAL MEANINGS OF A NEW TECHNOLOGY, 
1880–1940, at 391 (1990) (describing the transformative effect of electricity in the United States). 
46 Id. at 141. 
47 See RICHARD F. HIRSH, POWER LOSS: THE ORIGINS OF DEREGULATION AND RESTRUCTURING 
IN THE AMERICAN ELECTRIC UTILITY SYSTEM 13 (1999) (describing how utilities evolved from small 
local entities “into giant, centralized electric power corporations” during the 1890s–1900s). 
48 Novak, supra note 34, at 397 (“[T]he central question was what new forms of control would 
arise to contain and regulate the new concentrations and organizations of economic power.”). 
49 See, e.g., DANIEL T. RODGERS, ATLANTIC CROSSINGS: SOCIAL POLITICS IN A PROGRESSIVE 
AGE 135–36, 148–49 (1998) (noting that municipalization was a major issue in mayoral campaigns in 
New York City, Detroit, Chicago, San Francisco, and Cleveland, among others); Edward F. Dunne, 
Our Fight for Municipal Ownership, THE INDEPENDENT, Oct. 1906, at 927 (“In recent years perhaps 
no subject has engrossed so much of the attention of the public in the great cities of this country . . . as 
the question of ownership and operation by the public of public utilities.”). 
50 See Forrest McDonald, Samuel Insull and the Movement for State Utility Regulatory Commis-
sions, 32 BUS. HIST. REV. 241, 250–51 (1958) (describing the importance of a 1907 National Civic 
Federation report in tilting opinions towards state commission regulation); Shelley Welton, Public 
Energy, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267, 285–89 (2017) (describing the historical debate between proponents 
of municipal ownership and proponents of commission control of private utilities). 
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tion had wrought.51 The consumer interest, writ large, was pitted against the 
impulses of these corporate giants to take advantage of everyday people.52 In 
the end, largely due to distrust of corrupt local governments,53 state public util-
ity regulation won the day and every state in fairly rapid succession established 
a commission to regulate a number of private service providers as public utili-
ties, including electricity, natural gas, railroads, and telephone service.54 In ex-
change for a monopoly service territory, these utility companies agreed to pro-
vide safe and adequate service to all customers within the territory at commis-
sion-determined “just and reasonable” rates.55 
Public utility law presented a sweeping new theory of the interrelation-
ship between state and market actors rooted in a hierarchy in which public 
needs trumped profit motives and laissez-faire economics.56 And it was a theo-
ry put into action: commissions proved largely successful in their mission of 
                                                                                                                           
51 See THOMAS C. LEONARD, ILLIBERAL REFORMERS: RACE, EUGENICS & AMERICAN ECONOM-
ICS IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 4 (2016) (“Between 1895 and 1904, a sweeping merger movement 
consolidated scores of American industries: 1,800 major industrial firms disappeared into 157 mer-
gers.”); Novak, supra note 34, at 393 (“[P]rogressives increasingly considered monopoly and the 
concentration of economic interests as a problem in and of themselves . . . .”). 
52 Boyd, supra note 21, at 1649; see Novak, supra note 34, at 392 (describing how this system 
was explicitly advanced). 
53 See HIRSH, supra note 47, at 19 (outlining how state legislatures made reforms to rectify cor-
ruption in local government). Many scholars also suggest that the utilities supported state regulation as 
an alternative to public ownership, helping forge a “consensus” around state commissions. See id. at 
23–24; Robert L. Bradley, Jr., Introduction: The Origins and Development of Electric Power Regula-
tion to THE END OF A NATURAL MONOPOLY: DEREGULATION AND COMPETITION IN THE ELECTRIC 
POWER INDUSTRY 43, 56 (Peter Z. Grossman & Daniel H. Cole eds., 2003); Boyd, supra note 21, at 
1642. 
54 See HIRSH, supra note 47, at 19 (describing the rise of utility regulation based on the passage 
of model laws). For a longer recounting of this history, see Boyd, supra note 21, at 1636–51. William 
Novak explains how railroad regulation was really the driving force behind public utility law. See 
William J. Novak, The Public Utility Idea and the Origins of Modern Business Regulation, in CORPO-
RATIONS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 139, 160–61 (Naomi R. Lamoreaux & William J. Novak eds., 
2017) (presenting “the railroad problem” that suddenly faced the Supreme Court and the federal gov-
ernment during the late nineteenth century). 
55 Boyd, supra note 21, at 1619, 1641–42 (describing key elements of early exemplar state public 
utility statutes). “Just and reasonable” is a term of art that anchors most public utility statutes; it de-
scribes the standard for regulated prices that public utility companies charge and the companies’ cor-
responding duty to uphold that standard. Id. The Supreme Court case Munn v. Illinois, which upheld 
price regulation of Chicago’s grain elevators as constitutional, laid the legal foundation for this regula-
tory innovation. 94 U.S. 113 (1877); see also Boyd, supra note 21, at 1637 (explaining Munn’s im-
portance). 
56 See Boyd, supra note 21, at 1616 (calling the innovation of public utility “among the most 
powerful and evocative in American law”); Novak, supra note 34, at 399 (describing the idea of the 
public utility as emerging from the trend against monopolies and for public service). As David Spence 
and Robert Prentice have detailed, Progressive control over the oil industry proceeded not through 
commissions, but rather through antitrust law. See David B. Spence & Robert Prentice, The Transfor-
mation of American Energy Markets and the Problem of Market Power, 53 B.C. L. REV. 131, 135–36 
(2012) (outlining how the Sherman Act was used against Rockefeller’s Standard Oil). 
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providing affordable electrical service and other public goods to those living 
within the territories of regulated utilities.57 Also notable, however, is what 
public utility regulation—this grand innovation born of Progressive scholars’, 
politicians’, and activists’ desire to elevate the masses58—did not do. Public 
utility law might require utility companies to serve all customers within their 
territory, but it did not force utilities to operate in areas they chose not to.59 
Consequently, vast rural swaths of the country remained unserved.60 
Other scholars today critique Progressives for vaunting technocracy over 
democracy, pointing out the ways in which their reforms carved out a promi-
nent role for experts by adjudicating the so-called “public interest” through 
institutions, such as public utility commissions.61 Legal historian William No-
vak contests this characterization, arguing that the turn to commissions was 
pro-democratic—an experiment in new ways to elevate the needs of the broad-
er populace over the interests of businesses that dominated the political institu-
tions of the era.62 Nevertheless, Progressives’ reliance on independent commis-
sions to control energy delivery created an ongoing conundrum regarding what 
role the public should play in these technically-oriented adjudicatory bodies.63 
                                                                                                                           
57 See HIRSH, supra note 47, at 55 (explaining that by the end of World War II, utility customers 
in the United States were able to enjoy the benefits of “ever-cheaper electricity”). For the sake of 
space, I am glossing over several other commission-related reforms during this era that aimed to con-
trol market power, including the Hepburn Act, the Interstate Commerce Commission, and the Federal 
Trade Commission. See Tomain, supra note 16, at 359. 
58 See John Burns, Municipal Ownership a Blessing, THE INDEPENDENT, Feb. 1906, at 449 (ad-
vocating municipal ownership of electricity as a tool for “dispers[ing] the ghettos of poverty, the 
slums of misery and the Alsatias of vice”); NYE, supra note 45, at 156–57 (explaining that electricity 
was the case of many contradictions, including both economic growth and unemployment). 
59 See Shelley Welton, Clean Electrification, 88 U. COLO. L. REV. 571, 614 (2017); see also NYE, 
supra note 45, at 292, 308; Bruce Wyman, The Obligations of Public Services to Make Connections, 
22 HARV. L. REV. 564, 571 (1909) (remarking that those who provide a designated service need not 
go beyond the service they have committed to provide). 
60 NYE, supra note 45, at 287 (“[B]y the end of the 1920s, . . . 90 percent of the farmers in the 
United States could not get distribution lines to their homes and those few who did often paid double 
the urban rate.”). 
61 LEONARD, supra note 51, at 38 (“University-certified experts advised or served the administra-
tive state in the fourth branch of government . . . in the name of an expert-identified common good.”). 
62 See William J. Novak, The Progressive Idea of Democratic Administration, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 
1823, 1837–47 (2019). 
63 See William T. Gormley, John Hoadley & Charles Williams, Potential Responsiveness in the 
Bureaucracy: Views of Public Utility Regulation, 77 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 704, 705 (1983) (analyzing 
the policy implications of public utility responsiveness). See generally David Arkush, Democracy and 
Administrative Legitimacy, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 611 (2012); Reeve T. Bull, Making the Admin-
istrative State “Safe for Democracy”: A Theoretical and Practical Analysis of Citizen Participation in 
Agency Decisionmaking, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 611, 617, 622 (2013); Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Re-
thinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 411, 470 (2005); Wendy Wagner, The Participa-
tion-Centered Model Meets Administrative Process, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 671. 
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Certain Progressive reformers also carried disturbing ideological baggage. 
Several key intellectuals behind the public utility movement were decidedly 
racist, and some to the point of supporting race-based immigration policies, 
race- and gender-based workplace exclusions, and eugenics.64 This does not 
necessarily invalidate their regulatory innovations.65 But it does, perhaps, ex-
plain something about the choice of commissions as a regulatory tool. By giv-
ing commissions the authority to set rates for private companies, public utility 
law focused on keeping energy prices low for the deserving poor—that is, 
those whose station in society afforded them the means to pay for it.66 
B. New Deal Legal Gap-Filling and the Mid-Century Détente: 1930–1970 
By the 1930s, several material problems with the earlier phase of U.S. en-
ergy law caught the attention of lawmakers and scholars. The first was the 
yawning divide in urban and rural electrification rates. Whereas urban dwellers 
considered electricity a commonplace necessity by this time, ninety percent of 
farms still lacked access to this essential resource.67 Progressives needed a new 
legal solution for this challenge because rate regulation could not force the ex-
pansion of utilities’ service territories.68 
Laws adopted in the 1930s facilitated rural electrification through a two-
pronged strategy. First, the Rural Electrification Act provided loans to self-
                                                                                                                           
64 LEONARD, supra note 51, at xi (describing how the Progressive campaign of labor reform ex-
cluded “the disabled, immigrants, African Americans, and women from the American work force, all 
in the name of progress”); id. at xii (noting that Richard T. Ely and John R. Commons, both influential 
figures in the public utility scholarship, supported theories of “race suicide,” purporting that “racially 
inferior immigrants, by undercutting American workers’ wages, outbred and displaced their Anglo-
Saxon betters”). For more on Ely and Commons and their contributions to the public utility debates, 
see Boyd, supra note 21, at 1654–57; Novak, supra note 34, at 392; RODGERS, supra note 49, at 148–
59. 
65 See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Progressives: Racism and Public Law, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 947, 
949 (2017) (agreeing that many Progressives were racist but defending them on the grounds that 
“Progressives inherited these views, and they were not appreciably different from those held by most 
of their non-Progressive predecessors and contemporaries”). 
66 Cf. BLAKE EMERSON, THE PUBLIC’S LAW: ORIGINS AND ARCHITECTURE OF PROGRESSIVE 
DEMOCRACY 67 (2019) (observing Progressives’ “poor record on questions of racial equality, with 
policies aimed at advancing labor and the middle class often advancing side by side with the perpetua-
tion and deepening of the racial caste system” (footnote omitted)); HIRSH, supra note 47, at 11 (“Cus-
tomers had a responsibility as well—to pay rates high enough to guarantee the financial wherewithal 
of the power firms.”). 
67 NYE, supra note 45, at 287; see DAVID E. NYE, CONSUMING POWER: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF 
AMERICAN ENERGIES 171 (1999) (reporting that from 1905 to the 1930s, wired houses jumped from 
fewer than 10% to 75%). 
 68 NYE, supra note 45, at 304. President Franklin D. Roosevelt considered rural electrification a 
key component of a New Deal reform agenda. Id. 
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organized cooperatives to build their own electricity networks.69 Second, the Ten-
nessee Valley Authority Act authorized large-scale, federally-built-and-owned 
infrastructure, particularly hydropower dams, to provide cheap electrical power 
to communities that constructed their own delivery systems.70 Although utili-
ties resisted these plans, many large corporations supported them as a strategy 
to increase consumer demand for electric appliances.71 These legal strategies 
proved exceedingly successful in communities that were capable of capitaliz-
ing on them––within twenty years, cooperatives had wired ninety percent of 
their service territories.72 
Again, however, these solutions posed distinct limitations. Low-interest 
loans worked only for communities that had enough density, wherewithal, and 
money to organize themselves into viable cooperatives. These were the deserv-
ing rural poor. Moreover, scholars have documented the disparate impacts of 
the large federal power projects built to supply electricity to these coopera-
tives. Unsurprisingly, the losers from rural electrification were “the most vul-
nerable: poor farm tenants, African and Native Americans, and farmers forci-
bly removed from their lands.”73 
The limits of state-level energy regulation had also become apparent by 
the 1930s. In 1920, Congress passed the Federal Water Power Act to give a 
federal commission the authority to license dams on interstate navigable wa-
ters and to control interstate hydropower rates.74 This commission––the prede-
cessor of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)––gained addi-
tional powers as large interstate gas and electric companies outgrew state regu-
                                                                                                                           
 69 See Rural Electrification Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-605, §§ 2–4, 49 Stat. 1363, 1363–65 
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 901); RURAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., A 
BRIEF HISTORY OF THE RURAL ELECTRIC AND TELEPHONE PROGRAMS 1 (1983) (describing the me-
chanics of the Rural Electrification Act and how people may receive loans to gain access to electrici-
ty). 
70 See Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-17, 48 Stat. 58 (codified as 
amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 831–831ee); see also Welton, supra note 59, at 614–17 (describing these 
strategies in more detail). 
71 See NYE, supra note 45, at 318 (describing how cooperation between utilities and private in-
dustry helped to get the latter on board with the initiative); ROY TALBERT, JR., FDR’S UTOPIAN: AR-
THUR MORGAN OF THE TVA 145–48 (1987) (outlining the competition to take advantage of the laws 
to market electric appliances). 
72 See Jim Cooper, Policy Essay, Electric Co-Operatives: From New Deal to Bad Deal?, 45 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 335, 347–55 (2008) (outlining the rapid growth and success of co-ops); Alexandra 
B. Klass & Gabriel Chan, Cooperative Clean Energy, 99 N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manu-
script at 9–11) (on file with authors). 
73 Atif Ansar, The Fate of Ideals in the Real World: A Long View on Philip Selznick’s Classic on 
the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), 36 INT’L J. PROJECT MGMT. 385, 391 (2018); see also Richard 
Lowitt, The TVA: 1933–45, in TVA: FIFTY YEARS OF GRASS-ROOTS BUREAUCRACY 35, 52, 58–59 
(Erwin C. Hargrove & Paul K. Conkin eds., 1981) (discussing discrimination in the TVA). 
74 Federal Water Power Act, ch. 285, 41 Stat. 1063 (1920) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 16 U.S.C.); NORDHAUS & KALEN, supra note 16, at 18. 
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lators’ ability to manage them, leading to regulatory gaps and allowing some 
unscrupulous holding companies to take advantage of unwary investors.75 To 
vest federal regulators with the authority necessary to manage such companies, 
Congress passed a series of statutes extending the practices of rate regulation 
to the federal level for both gas and electricity.76 At the same time, Congress 
placed limits on massive holding companies by refusing to allow them to in-
vest in noncontiguous territories, so as to limit their economic and political 
sway.77 These innovations created the enduring foundations of federal public 
utility law today. 
A third challenge confronting lawmakers during the New Deal era related 
to the extraction of oil and natural gas. The law of capture had worked too 
well, and by the 1930s, super-productive oil fields were so full of wells that “a 
person could walk from derrick to derrick without stepping on the ground.”78 
Such density proved inefficient because the overabundance of wells dimin-
ished the productive capacity of the fields and left oil and gas trapped under-
ground.79 Regulators responded with a new generation of federal and state con-
servation laws.80 These laws included well spacing requirements, legal ar-
rangements that forced landowners above a reservoir to work cooperatively 
rather than competitively, and state and interstate compacts that periodically 
restricted the amount that producers could bring to market.81 These conserva-
tion laws, however, did not have an environmental focus; their goal was simply 
maximum efficient production of fossil fuels.82 
After the frenetic lawmaking of the 1930s, energy law entered decades of 
stasis—or what historian Richard Hirsh has described as the “utility consen-
                                                                                                                           
75 See Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83, 89–90 (1927) (holding 
under the Commerce Clause that electricity sold between states could only be regulated by federal 
government). 
76 See, e.g., Federal Power Act, ch. 687, 49 Stat. 838 (1935) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 16 U.S.C.); Natural Gas Act, ch. 556, 52 Stat. 821 (1938) (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 15 U.S.C.); see also Alexandra B. Klass & Danielle Meinhardt, Transporting Oil and 
Gas: U.S. Infrastructure Challenges, 100 IOWA L. REV. 947, 995 (2015). 
77 See Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, ch. 687, 49 Stat. 803 (codified as amended at 
15 U.S.C. §§ 79–79z-6) (repealed 2005). 
78 Anderson, supra note 37, at 235. 
79 Id. 
80 See Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 211–12 (1900) (upholding Indiana regulations limit-
ing waste from wells); Anderson, supra note 37, at 232, 236 (describing early efforts by state and 
federal government to enact conservation laws). New Deal-era conservation laws had earlier roots in 
some states, but the 1930s saw a marked increase in such conservation statutes. See Ohio Oil Co., 177 
U.S. at 211–12; Anderson, supra note 37, at 232, 236. 
81 Anderson, supra note 37, at 237, 239–41. 
82 Id. at 244 (“A major objective of conservation agencies was to conserve reservoir energy to 
maximize oil production.”); see Coleman, supra note 44, at 411 (describing how state conservation 
regulations serve to increase efficiency, rather than environmental protection). 
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sus.”83 Through 1970, energy consumption steadily rose, prices steadily fell, 
and no one was much bothered to consider further legal reforms.84 During this 
same time period, the physical landscape of the United States and people’s en-
gagement with fossil fuels were dramatically transformed. In particular, federal 
highway funding and increased federal home financing options during the 
1950s facilitated the accelerated rise of automobility and suburban develop-
ment patterns.85 These developments contributed substantially to the increasing 
dominance of oil and natural gas.86 Moreover, governments of all scales disin-
vested in mass transit, such that bus and trolley ridership plummeted from 17.2 
billion passengers per year in 1950 to fewer than 7 billion per year in the early 
1970s.87 Energy law, however, barely registered these shifts because there was 
no real material challenge presented by the rising use of oil and gas. Oil prices 
declined and consumers were able to obtain the increasing amounts of gasoline 
they demanded without significant government intervention.88  
The emergence of the nuclear energy industry brought about new regula-
tory oversight, but largely of the same conceptual model as natural gas and 
electricity: regulation by commission.89 Scholars studying this model did begin 
to point out the dangers of the commission format should regulators and regu-
lated utilities grow too cozy90—but systematic critiques fell by the wayside in 
                                                                                                                           
83 See HIRSH, supra note 47, at 11; see also Tomain, supra note 16, at 356 (describing “the sym-
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note 45, at 187 (noting that U.S. energy production rose a staggering 300% between the late nine-
teenth century to the 1940s as American factories implemented electricity, providing a cheap means to 
increase efficiency). 
85 See NYE, supra note 45, at 206; ROTHSTEIN, supra note 22, at 59–76. 
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87 See id. at 206. 
88 See James M. Summers, Case for Decontrolling the Price and Allocation of Crude Oil, 53 
TEX. L. REV. 1275, 1276 (1975) (describing how, at the time, the federal government put few limits 
on oil). 
89 See Tomain, supra note 16, at 368. One important legal innovation for nuclear power was the 
passage of the Price-Anderson Act that limited nuclear facilities’ liability in the case of an accident. 
Atomic Energy Damages Act (Price-Anderson Act), Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (1957) (codified 
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the face of good material outcomes. When outcomes changed, however, new 
currents of legal thought grew stronger. 
C. The (Partial) Collapse of the Consensus: 1970–2000 
The longstanding utility consensus cracked in the 1970s.91 By this point, 
technological advancements had stalled and the energy crisis of 1973 sent 
prices skyrocketing.92 As consumers lined up at the gas pumps, the federal 
government responded with one of its few attempts to directly manage oil 
prices through price control and allocation programs.93 These programs, how-
ever, proved largely ineffectual and short-lived.94 There were also some efforts 
to address the oil shortage from the angle of consumption that manifested most 
prominently through the adoption of Corporate Average Fuel Economy Stand-
ards (CAFE) legislation.95 This controversial legislation placed requirements 
on automobile manufacturers to meet increasing fleetwide average miles-per-
gallon targets.96 
When it came to natural gas, the federal government by this point had 
controlled prices for decades, following a much-maligned Supreme Court 
opinion in 1954 that required FERC to exercise heavy-handed oversight of gas 
transactions.97 The agency’s strategy for managing this task, however, had cre-
ated a shortage in natural gas by the 1970s.98 
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92 HIRSH, supra note 47, at 45; Fred Bosselman, A Brief History of Energy Law in United States 
Law Schools: An Introduction to the Symposium, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 3 (2011). In 1973, the 
members of Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) declared an oil embargo against 
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93 Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-159, 87 Stat. 627 (codified as 
amended at scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); Summers, supra note 88, at 1276. 
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95 See Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-163, §§ 501–506, 89 Stat. 
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96 See COMM. ON THE EFFECTIVENESS & IMPACT OF CORP. AVERAGE FUEL ECON. (CAFE) 
STANDARDS, NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, EFFECTIVENESS AND IMPACT OF CORPORATE AVERAGE FUEL 
ECONOMY (CAFE) STANDARDS 3 (2002), https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/162944_web.
pdf [https://perma.cc/9KJ2-BHDJ]. 
97 See Philips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672, 685 (1954); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The 
Evolution of Natural Gas Regulatory Policy, NAT. RES. & ENV’T, Summer 1995, at 53, 54. 
98 Pierce, supra note 97, at 54. 
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Although these shortages and price shocks brought some attention to the 
plight of low-income consumers struggling to heat and power their homes and 
fuel their cars, only tepid reforms resulted. Congress created two taxpayer-
funded programs, the Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program and the 
Weatherization Assistance Program, to provide support to low-income families 
struggling to pay bills.99 But these efforts were always modest, and in the dec-
ades since their implementation the federal government has chronically under-
funded them.100 Some states adopted shut-off protections for the particularly 
vulnerable in cases of temperature extremes, and a few adopted “lifeline rates” 
that provided discounts for their poorest residents.101 There was a general re-
luctance to subsidize bills by charging other ratepayers more, however, and 
even less appetite for funding any assistance programs through general tax-
es.102 Central to this reluctance was the rise within energy law of a particular 
economic notion of “equity” that emphasized the importance of each class of 
ratepayers paying its fair share.103 
Environmentalism also rose to prominence during the 1970s, but with on-
ly tangential impacts on energy law. Rate regulation largely accepted environ-
mental regulation as an input. For example, air quality regulations that required 
the addition of a scrubber might raise the cost of electricity or cause a particu-
lar utility to shift among energy sources, but they did not fundamentally re-
shape energy law or energy regulatory institutions.104 Similarly, although the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) placed new procedural require-
ments on energy infrastructure projects, it did little to reshape the substantive 
law that governed them.105 Energy law remained comfortably in its silo, fo-
cused on delivering energy at low prices. 
                                                                                                                           
 99 Sanya Carley & David M. Konisky, The Justice and Equity Implications of the Clean Energy 
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101 Welton, supra note 59, at 619. 
102 Id. 
103 Gerald R. Faulhaber, Cross-Subsidization: Pricing in Public Enterprises, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 
966, 966 (1975) (defining policy-makers’ equity concerns about whether a proposed price structure 
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FAIRNESS OR EFFICIENCY: AN INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC UTILITY PRICING (1978) (arguing that pub-
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104 See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Past, Present, and Future of Energy Regulation, 31 UTAH 
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105 See HIRSH, supra note 47, at 66 (describing environmentalists’ use of NEPA to delay or halt 
nuclear projects in the 1970s); Freeman, supra note 20, at 361–64. 
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Up until this period, law schools generally offered two separate classes on 
energy: oil and gas law and the law of regulated industries. The former focused 
on the extraction and transport of these fuels, while the latter included public 
utility regulation of electricity and natural gas. But during the 1970s, there was 
a renewed interest in energy as a material problem for American society, such 
that the common threads between these subject areas grew more apparent.106 
Consequently, scholars began to frame energy law as more of a coherent and 
distinct discipline, complete with its own law journal as of 1979.107 
The crises that renewed interest in energy law also gave critics of the pub-
lic utility regime more of an audience. Here again, material problems in energy 
supply and delivery drove change. Drawing on the antiregulatory theory and 
rhetoric of the Chicago School, public choice scholars voiced distrust of regu-
lators’ ability to either discern or make decisions in favor of the public inter-
est.108 The strongest version of this argument suggested that commissions are 
subject to capture in much the same way as politicians, and that commissioners 
act to preserve their own roles in the industry above all else.109 Based on these 
critiques, public choice theorists went for the jugular: arguing that the antidote 
to imperfect bureaucracy was its elimination through deregulation.110 
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options); Boyd, supra note 21, at 1651–56 (tracing the history of the public choice critique of public 
utility); David B. Spence, Can Law Manage Competitive Energy Markets?, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 765, 
770 (2008) (describing deregulation of electricity and gas as having “both an economic and a political 
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The idea quickly caught hold in influential energy policy circles. Con-
gress passed legislation beginning the deregulation of natural gas prices in 
1978, and FERC followed up with a series of orders aimed at increasing com-
petition in the natural gas sector during the 1980s.111 Electricity deregulation 
proceeded more slowly, complicated by the fact that the technology requires a 
high degree of planning to perfectly balance supply and demand of electricity 
at all times.112 Nevertheless, early success in promoting more sectoral competi-
tion helped persuade scholars and regulators of the potential for electricity sec-
tor deregulation.113 Consequently, during the 1990s, some states began to split 
up their utilities, requiring companies delivering power to sell off generation 
assets.114 Many states also embraced “retail competition,” allowing residents to 
shop among energy providers rather than remain tethered to a monopoly ser-
vice provider.115 On the wholesale level, Congress and FERC encouraged re-
gions to band their utilities together to form grid management organizations 
and centralized energy markets.116 Congress also relaxed the longstanding re-
quirements that limited the size of utility holding companies—a move that util-
ities insisted would help them better compete through diversification of as-
sets.117 Today, although substantial regulatory oversight endures at both the 
state and federal levels, electricity markets determine what energy gets bought 
and sold in most of the country.118 
The transformation to more of a market-based system for regulating energy 
prices was premised on saving consumers money. Tracing its effectiveness even 
                                                                                                                           
111 See Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350 (codified at scattered 
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in this limited regard, however, has proven challenging. Many studies find gains 
in operating efficiency,119 but whether these savings are funneled to producers or 
consumers is not clear.120 Scholars have also raised concerns that this more mar-
ket-oriented system is scarcely immune from the same domination by powerful 
incumbent firms that public choice theorists claimed it would eradicate.121 
D. 1990s–2020: Energy Law Meets Climate Change, First Generation 
Alongside energy deregulation, the 1990s also ushered in growing con-
cern about global climate change. It was always clear that the energy sector—
as the lifeblood and driver of a fossil-based economy—would need to feature 
centrally in any serious effort to remediate the mounting climate crisis. 
Scholars of energy law have responded much more enthusiastically to this 
challenge than has the energy sector as a whole. Articles since the 1990s have 
proposed a range of thoughtful amendments to the energy laws bequeathed to 
us by the twentieth century to help decarbonize the sector. Scholars have de-
voted significant attention to the design and functionality of renewable portfo-
lio standards (RPS), which mandate that utilities purchase a certain percentage 
of their electricity from renewable energy sources, often increasing over 
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time.122 They have also thoroughly explored the role of tax incentives in re-
newable energy development, and have advanced reforms in utility rate struc-
tures and practices like net metering with the aim of rewarding utilities’ pursuit 
of energy efficiency and other distributed energy technologies.123 
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More broadly, scholars have mounted compelling arguments about the 
need to reprice energy to reflect its true societal costs. They have rigorously 
vetted, compared, and contrasted the merits of cap-and-trade programs and 
carbon taxation.124 And considerable effort has been spent exploring how to 
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507 (2010); Shi-Ling Hsu, A Complete Analysis of Carbon Taxation: Considering the Revenue Side, 
65 BUFF. L. REV. 857 (2017); Gary M. Lucas, Jr., Behavioral Public Choice and the Carbon Tax, 
2017 UTAH L. REV. 115, https://dc.law.utah.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1033&context=ulr 
[https://perma.cc/JWL4-5ZJX]; Lesley K. McAllister, The Enforcement Challenge of Cap-and-Trade 
Regulation, 40 ENV’T L. 1195 (2010); Lesley K. McAllister, Beyond Playing “Banker”: The Role of 
the Regulatory Agency in Emissions Trading, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 269 (2007); Brian C. Murray & 
Heather Hosterman, Climate Change, Cap-and-Trade and the Outlook for U.S. Policy, 34 N.C. J. 
INT’L L. & COM. REG. 699 (2009); Carol M. Rose, Hot Spots in the Legislative Climate Change Pro-
posals, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 189 (2008), https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/
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redesign energy markets to make them more favorable to clean energy125 and 
how to navigate the federal-state jurisdictional tensions that make this space 
legally tricky.126 
Scholars of oil and gas law have also contended with a dramatically altered 
physical landscape since the late 1990s. Over the last couple of decades, the do-
mestic oil and gas industries have enjoyed a staggering revival through wide-
spread commercialization of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing (frack-
ing) technologies. As James Coleman describes, the fracking boom “dwarfs pre-
vious oil and gold rushes—there is simply no historical analogue for the scale 
of the oil and gas revolution currently sweeping the United States.”127 In a few 
brief years, the United States has become the world’s top oil and gas produc-
er—ahead of even Saudi Arabia and Russia.128 Oil and gas law has adapted to 
this new reality by embracing evolving theories of capture and conservation 
that account for the different properties of fractured gas—including environ-
                                                                                                                           
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1086&context=nulr_online [https://perma.cc/9AVY-YSGD]; Stephen 
Sewalk, Carbon Tax with Reinvestment Trumps Cap-and-Trade, 30 PACE ENV’T L. REV. 580 (2013); 
Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful U.S. Cap-and-Trade System to Address Climate Change, 32 HARV. 
ENV’T L. REV. 293 (2008); Michael Waggoner, Why and How to Tax Carbon, 20 COLO. J. INT’L 
ENV’T L. & POL’Y 1 (2008); Michael Wara, Instrument Choice, Carbon Emissions, and Information, 
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Planet, 19 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 515 (2009). 
125 For articles discussing ways to reconfigure energy markets, see generally Todd S. Aagaard & 
Andrew N. Kleit, The Complexity Dilemma in Policy Market Design, 30 DUKE ENV’T L. & POL’Y F. 1 
(2019); Boyd, supra note 21; Danny Cullenward & Shelley Welton, The Quiet Undoing: How Re-
gional Electricity Market Reforms Threaten State Clean Energy Goals, 36 YALE J. ON REG. 106 
(2018); Justin Gundlach & Romany Webb, Distributed Energy Resource Participation in Wholesale 
Markets: Lessons from the California ISO, 39 ENERGY L.J. 47 (2018); Emily Hammond & David B. 
Spence, The Regulatory Contract in the Marketplace, 69 VAND. L. REV. 141 (2016); Macey & 
Salovaara, supra note 121; John S. Moot, Subsidies, Climate Change, Electric Markets and the FERC, 
35 ENERGY L.J. 345 (2014); Michael Panfil & Rama Zakaria, Uncovering Wholesale Electricity Mar-
ket Principles, 9 MICH. J. ENV’T & ADMIN. L. 145 (2019); Ari Peskoe, Easing Jurisdictional Tensions 
by Integrating Public Policy in Wholesale Electricity Markets, 38 ENERGY L.J. 1 (2017); Amy L. 
Stein, Regulating Reliability, 54 HOUS. L. REV. 1191 (2017); Julia E. Sullivan, The Intersection of 
Federally Regulated Power Markets and State Energy and Environmental Goals, 26 FORDHAM 
ENV’T L. REV. 474 (2015); Shelley Welton, Electricity Markets and the Social Project of Decarboni-
zation, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1067 (2018). 
126 For a discussion of jurisdictional tensions, see generally Matthew R. Christiansen & Joshua C. 
Macey, Long Live the Federal Power Act’s Bright Line, 134 HARV. L. REV. 1360 (2021); Joel B. 
Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1783 
(2016); Matt Flaherty, Evolving Energy Federalism: Zero Emissions Credits and Opportunities in 
State Energy Policy, 10 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 1 (2019); Robert R. Nordhaus, The 
Hazy “Bright Line”: Defining Federal and State Regulation of Today’s Electric Grid, 36 ENERGY L.J. 
203 (2015); Jim Rossi, The Brave New Path of Energy Federalism, 95 TEX. L. REV. 399 (2016); Han-
nah J. Wiseman & Hari M. Osofsky, Regional Energy Governance and U.S. Carbon Emissions, 43 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 143 (2016). 
127 Coleman, supra note 44, at 419. 
128 Id. 
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mental conservation.129 Oil and gas scholars have also plumbed the ways in 
which the oft-called “fracking revolution” has provoked new debates over fed-
eralism and localism in oil and gas law.130 In addition, scholars now debate 
over the extent to which natural gas could be a bridge fuel to help transition the 
United States toward lower-carbon energy sources.131 
Viewed from the sector’s baseline, many of these policies have proven 
successful. U.S. greenhouse gas emissions dropped thirteen percent between 
2005 and 2019, largely due to hydraulically fractured natural gas replacing 
coal in the electricity sector.132 Renewable energy has grown rapidly during the 
same time period and now makes up nineteen percent of U.S. electricity gener-
ation––comprised of one-third hydro, one-third wind, and one-sixth solar, 
among other sources.133 Wind power has tripled since 2009, and solar has 
grown forty times over since that same year.134 The cost of these renewable 
                                                                                                                           
129 See Anderson, supra note 37, at 245, 253; Coleman, supra note 44, at 391–92; Tara K. Righet-
ti, Hannah J. Wiseman & James W. Coleman, The New Oil and Gas Governance, 130 YALE L.J.F. 51, 
53–54 (2020), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/the-new-oil-and-gas-governance [https://perma.
cc/W3DF-XWDV] (describing how regulators are increasingly addressing localized environmental 
impacts). 
130 See, e.g., John M. Golden & Hannah J. Wiseman, The Fracking Revolution: Shale Gas as a 
Case Study in Innovation Policy, 64 EMORY L.J. 955 (2015); Grace Heusner, Allison Sloto & Joshua 
Ulan Galperin, Defining and Closing the Hydraulic Fracturing Governance Gap, 95 DENV. L. REV. 
191 (2017); Amanda C. Leiter, Fracking as a Federalism Case Study, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 1123 
(2014); Albert C. Lin, Fracking and Federalism: A Comparative Approach to Reconciling National 
and Subnational Interests in the United States and Spain, 44 ENV’T L. 1039 (2014); Righetti et al., 
supra note 129; Hannah J. Wiseman, Risk and Response in Fracturing Policy, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 
729 (2013). 
131 For scholarly sources indicative of the debate, see generally Emily Hammond & Jim Rossi, 
Stranded Costs and Grid Decarbonization, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 645 (2017); Sam Kalen, A Bridge to 
Nowhere? Our Energy Transition and the Natural Gas Pipeline Wars, 9 MICH. J. ENV’T & ADMIN. L. 
319 (2020); Patrick Parenteau & Abigail Barnes, A Bridge Too Far: Building Off-Ramps on the Shale 
Gas Superhighway, 49 IDAHO L. REV. 325 (2013); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Natural Gas: A Long Bridge 
to a Promising Destination, 32 UTAH ENV’T L. REV. 245 (2012); Christopher Serkin & Michael P. 
Vandenbergh, Prospective Grandfathering: Anticipating the Energy Transition Problem, 102 MINN. 
L. REV. 1019 (2018). 
132 Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://
www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/inventory-us-greenhouse-gas-emissions-and-sinks [https://perma.cc/
G2YN-HN7X ] (June 16, 2021). 
133 See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK: WITH PROJECTIONS TO 2050 
62–64 (2020), https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/pdf/AEO2020%20Full%20Report.pdf [https://perma.
cc/Q2RS-3XNQ]. 
134 JONATHAN SUNDBY & GIDEON WEISSMAN, FRONTIER GRP., ROB SARGENT, ENV’T AM. RSCH. 
& POL’Y CTR., RENEWABLES ON THE RISE 2019: A DECADE OF PROGRESS TOWARD A CLEAN ENERGY 
FUTURE 1 (2019), https://frontiergroup.org/sites/default/files/reports/FRG%20AME%20Renewables
%20on%20the%20Rise%20Aug19.pdf [https://perma.cc/EH8L-LESQ]. 
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resources has also plummeted to the point where they are often more cost-
effective than coal generation, and in some instances, gas generation.135 
Although it proves analytically challenging to attribute a precise propor-
tion of increased renewable generation and decreased renewable costs to par-
ticular policies,136 analysts generally agree that RPS policies have played an 
important role in both trends.137 Similarly, the cap-and-trade program enacted 
across many Northeastern and mid-Atlantic states boasts that investments 
made with program revenues have resulted in “$1.8 billion in lifetime energy 
bill savings [and] 2.5 million short tons of CO2 emissions avoided.”138 The role 
of scholarship in driving these policies, as opposed to other pathways of policy 
diffusion and reform, is a difficult question that precludes facile claims of cau-
sality. At least it can be said that energy law scholars have been invested in 
advancing many of the key policy innovations of the last several decades. 
Especially in the tough federal political climate of the last several years, 
this is all good news. A broader lens, however, suggests that we may be reach-
ing the end of the line of interventions in this vein. As the next Part discusses, 
these efforts, although important, have barely scratched the surface of the radi-
cal transition necessary in U.S. energy production and consumption. 
II. THE CLIMATE CONVERSATION AND THE LIMITS OF  
EXISTING ENERGY LAW 
The previous Part roughly sketched the central themes and tenets of U.S. 
energy law as it evolved over its first one-hundred-and-fifty-plus years. Alt-
hough its amalgamated, fuel-specific nature makes it hard to distill energy law 
to a first principle, those who have tried have converged on the conclusion 
                                                                                                                           
135 See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 133, at 76 (projecting that solar PV and natural 
gas combined-cycle plants will be the most economically competitive generating technologies in 
2025). 
136 See Robinson Meyer, A Very Important Climate Fact That No One Knows, THE ATLANTIC 
(May 8, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2019/05/controversial-study-asks-do-
renewable-energy-standards-work/588823/ [https://perma.cc/MSD6-WKFS] (“Economics has no way 
of knowing whether RPS policies reduced the global price of renewable energy.”). 
137 See Galen Barbose, Ryan Wiser, Jenny Heeter, Trieu Mai, Lori Bird, Mark Bolinger, Alberta 
Carpenter, Garvin Heath, David Keyser, Jordan Macknick, Andrew Mills & Dev Millstein, A Retro-
spective Analysis of the Benefits and Impacts of U.S. Renewable Portfolio Standards, 96 ENERGY 
POL’Y 645, 657–58 (2016); Galen Barbose, Lori Bird, Jenny Heeter, Francisco Flores-Espino & Ryan 
Wiser, Costs and Benefits of Renewables Portfolio Standards in the United States, 52 RENEWABLE & 
SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REVS. 523, 524 (2015); Sanya Carley, Lincoln L. Davies, David B. Spence & 
Nikolaos Zirogiannis, Empirical Evaluation of the Stringency and Design of Renewable Portfolio 
Standards, 3 NATURE ENERGY 754, 754 (2018), https://www.nature.com/articles/s41560-018-0202-
4.pdf?proof=t [https://perma.cc/R2SU-NHXF] (pointing out the importance of analyzing variations in 
state RPS policies). 
138 Investment of Proceeds, REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, https://www.rggi.org/investments/
proceeds-investments [https://perma.cc/J2ZD-EMRC]. 
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that, “[p]ut simply, modern energy law has sought to keep energy prices low 
and supplies ample.”139 The core theories and doctrines in support of this deep-
ly material goal—the law of capture, public utility law in its many iterations, 
rural electrification, and conservation statutes—each brought considerable 
good, and they remain foundational components of energy law today. To 
acknowledge these laws as positive developments, however, does not excuse 
scholars today from interrogating what about these models still serves us and 
what must change. 
On this last point, I worry that the regulatory theories and structures be-
queathed to us by a century of fossil-fueled development are simply not up to 
the task of driving the decarbonization transformation that our energy system 
demands today. To date, energy law scholars––myself decidedly included140––
have focused on developing climate change mitigation strategies that essential-
ly color within the lines of the grand bargain struck last century between regu-
lators, regulated utilities, and in some places, newer market players within the 
energy space. Many of these ideas, including RPS, energy efficiency policies, 
and energy and carbon pricing reforms, have contributed greatly to the limited 
and uneven progress we have made in mitigating greenhouse gas emissions to 
date. 
As we have written, spoken, and advocated, however, overall-U.S. emis-
sions have barely budged, and even electricity sector emissions have failed to 
fall fast enough.141 This Part argues that to achieve the necessary transfor-
mation, energy law scholarship going forward must grapple with the limits of 
existing tools and frameworks, through situating and analyzing energy as part 
of a broader conversation about the shape of the U.S. economy and society. 
Section A focuses on energy law’s embrace of electricity to achieve decarboni-
zation and the efforts of fossil fuel companies to undermine renewable energy 
initiatives.142 Section B advocates for a reorientation of energy law scholarship 
in the United States towards addressing social injustice.143 
                                                                                                                           
139 Freeman, supra note 20, at 341; see also Heffron & Talus, supra note 16, at 4 (“In effect, the 
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little focus on the merits or value of other directions.”); Tomain, supra note 16, at 355 (“[O]ver the 
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140 See generally Welton, supra note 59; Welton, supra note 125; Shelley Welton, Non-
Transmission Alternatives, 39 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 457 (2015). 
141 Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks, supra note 132 (showing U.S. total 
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 142 See infra Part II, Section A. 
 143 See infra Part II, Section B. 
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A. Energy Law and the Decarbonization Imperative 
Starting from a place of climate science, rather than a catalogue of U.S. 
greenhouse gas emissions data, reveals a bleak picture. Because the United 
States and the world have delayed adequate climate action for several decades, 
scientists now calculate that we must embrace a dramatic and rapid transfor-
mation away from fossil fuels to avoid massive human suffering and ecologi-
cal catastrophe.144 To meet the internationally agreed upon goal of limiting 
global temperature increases to 2°C, the United States will need to reach zero 
net carbon emissions, or maybe even negative emissions levels, by 2050 at the 
latest. To reiterate, that’s zero carbon emissions on balance within three dec-
ades—a feat that will require reductions in emissions of 5–7% per year, going 
forward.145 Only the global recession of 2008 and the worldwide spread of 
COVID-19 have ever caused emissions to fall this rapidly in the past, and nei-
ther of those presents a desirable model for durable decarbonization.146 Moreo-
ver, emissions already appear to be rapidly bouncing back from their COVID-
19-induced dip,147 which further highlights the need for more transformative 
models. 
                                                                                                                           
144 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Summary for Policymakers, in GLOBAL 
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HEALTHY, RESILIENT, AND JUST AMERICA 3 (Comm. Print 2020) (presenting the current situation and 
a plan to get to zero emissions). 
146 Corinne Le Quéré, Robert B. Jackson, Matthew W. Jones, Adam J.P. Smith, Sam Abernethy, 
Robbie M. Andrew, Anthony J. De-Gol, David R. Willis, Yuli Shan, Josep G. Canadell, Pierre 
Friedlingstein, Felix Creutzig & Glen P. Peters, Temporary Reduction in Daily Global CO2 Emissions 
During the COVID-19 Forced Confinement, 10 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 647, 651–52 (2020). 
147 Patrick Smith, Carbon Emissions in 2021 to Pass Pre-Pandemic Levels, Report Warns, NBC 
NEWS (Apr. 20, 2021), https://www.nbcnews.com/science/environment/carbon-emissions-2021-pass-
pre-pandemic-levels-report-warns-n1264591 [https://perma.cc/D5M2-U76D] (“[A] s the United States 
and Europe tentatively end pandemic restrictions, the IEA predicts an increase in global energy de-
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strongly.”). 
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Rapid emissions reductions will need to occur across essentially every 
economic sector, particularly the energy-intensive sectors. The U.S. transporta-
tion sector now ranks first in terms of carbon pollution (29%), followed by 
electricity (25%), industry (23%), commercial and residential (13%), and agri-
culture (10%).148 But these sectors are also linked: the plan for decarbonizing 
transportation, the commercial and residential sectors, and large portions of the 
industrial sector is to electrify them.149 That means that the transformation of 
the electricity system will need to occur even earlier so that these sectors can 
turn to electricity as their pathway to decarbonization. To facilitate electrifica-
tion, in the next several decades, the U.S. electricity system will need to ap-
proximately triple in size while reducing its emissions 95–100% and reducing 
final energy demand by around 40%.150 
Because of electricity’s centrality to decarbonization, and also likely be-
cause it has proven materially easier to tackle, energy law scholarship has fo-
cused the bulk of its attention towards climate change on how to clean up the 
electricity sector. As noted above, emissions in this sector have come down, for 
a variety of reasons.151 Some states have achieved impressive drops in emis-
sions through enacting strong policies in support of renewable energy, which 
help strengthen economic coalitions that favor a clean energy transition.152 Re-
newable energy, however, is not the primary driver of falling emissions in the 
U.S. electricity sector. Instead, it has been the untenable “solution” of replac-
ing one fossil fuel—coal—with another slightly less dirty fossil fuel—natural 
gas.153 The buildout of substantial and long-lasting natural gas infrastructure 
                                                                                                                           
148 Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/
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149 See Jesse D. Jenkins, Max Luke & Samuel Thernstrom, Getting to Zero Carbon Emissions in 
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cc/AE28-2L34]; see also Jenkins et al., supra note 149, at 2506. 
 151 See supra notes 132–138 (discussing the decline in emissions over the last few years as a func-
tion of increased renewable energy generation and declining costs). 
152 See Biber, supra note 21, at 425–34 (providing California as an example); id., supra note 21, 
at 605 (explaining the brutal impacts of climate change if society does not adapt); Jonas Meckling, 
Nina Kelsey, Eric Biber & John Zysman, Winning Coalitions for Climate Policy, 349 SCIENCE 1170, 
1170–71 (2015) (outlining how coalitions can assist decarbonization). 
153 See Trevor Houser & Hannah Pitt, Preliminary US Emissions Estimates for 2019, RHODIUM 
GRP. (Jan. 7, 2020), https://rhg.com/research/preliminary-us-emissions-2019 [https://perma.cc/5YLL-
QXBQ] (describing how despite the fall in usage of coal, natural gas has increased in use to fill the 
gap). Natural gas combustion has half the carbon emissions of coal and considerably fewer local air 
pollutant emissions, however methane leaks during natural gas production offset a contested portion 
of its carbon benefits. See Ramón A. Alvarez, Daniel Zavala-Araiza, David R. Lyon, David T. Allen, 
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creates a formidable constituency opposed to renewable energy as a competitor 
technology.154 
In this vein, several researchers have documented how fossil fuel-
centered coalitions continue to stymie or reverse clean energy progress at vari-
ous levels of government. For example, Leah Stokes’s 2020 book, Short Cir-
cuiting Policy, carefully examines the politics of renewable energy in several 
“red” states that passed clean energy legislation. Focusing on policy battles in 
Texas, Kansas, Arizona, and Ohio, her research illustrates how powerful fossil 
fuel-allied interest groups worked to erode these clean energy victories over 
time through their influence in both statehouses and public utility commis-
sions.155 Even in California, big oil and gas interests have thwarted statewide 
efforts to tighten the carbon pricing system.156 
Matto Mildenberger extends this analysis to the federal level in his 2020 
book, Carbon Captured, which describes how high-carbon business sectors 
and workers form coalitions to effectively block robust federal climate legisla-
tion.157 Other legal scholarship similarly traces how anti-clean energy efforts 
permeate federal regulatory agencies.158 
Although COVID-19 has destabilized the oil and gas industry in the short 
term, it is not clear that this pattern will persist without enhanced regulatory 
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9b800a5fd9c48866 [https://perma.cc/85AS-4DEN] (reflecting a 10% increase in U.S. natural gas 
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154 See Richard Newell & Daniel Raimi, Despite Renewables Growth, There Has Never Been an 
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6NLM-WTBW] (arguing that to effectuate an energy transition, “renewables and new technologies 
will need to do more than build atop CO2-intensive fossil fuels—they will need to push out incum-
bents”). 
155 STOKES, supra note 11, at 3–4. See generally Peskoe, supra note 123; Troy A. Rule, Solar En-
ergy, Utilities, and Fairness, 6 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 115 (2015) (demystifying the 
arguments from pro-fossil fuel legislators and rooftop solar advocates to spur an informed debate 
around solar energy and debunk the utility of fairness-based reasoning). 
 156 Matto Mildenberger & Leah C. Stokes, The Trouble with Carbon Pricing, BOS. REV. (Sept. 
24, 2020), http://bostonreview.net/science-nature-politics/matto-mildenberger-leah-c-stokes-trouble-
carbon-pricing [https://perma.cc/KC3G-EBD4] (“Though legislators aimed to tighten [California’s 
cap-and-trade] law in 2017, oil and gas lobbyists thwarted their efforts.”). 
157 MILDENBERGER, supra note 11, at 20–21, 42–43. 
158 See, e.g., Cullenward & Welton, supra note 125; Macey & Salovaara, supra note 121; Welton, 
supra note 121. 
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interventions.159 Even with rapid growth in the renewable energy sector over the 
last decade, researchers have found that fossil fuel companies’ political spending 
at the federal level has continued to outpace renewable companies’ spending by 
at least thirteen to one.160 Utilities also engage heavily in lobbying and political 
spending and donate disproportionately to Republican candidates.161 
This research and reality cast doubt on the optimistic view that cheap re-
newables will inevitably force fossil fuels out of existence.162 The legal tools 
that scholars and policy-makers have developed and selectively deployed are 
working, but these tools are not spreading fast enough and, in most places, are 
not demanding deep or swift enough transformations of the electricity sector. 
The projections from the Energy Information Administration (EIA) are telling: 
based on current policies, the EIA projects that electricity generation will grow 
modestly through 2050, with additions to the sector dominated by renewables 
and natural gas.163 Relatedly, the EIA projects that electricity sector emissions 
will decline only slightly, as economic growth ultimately overtakes gains made 
through greater sectoral deployment of renewables.164 Hopefully, these EIA 
projections will prove to be too conservative, as they frequently have been in 
the past, but they would have to be wrong by orders of magnitude to accord 
with decarbonization imperatives.165 
To summarize: gains made in public utility law and various forms of car-
bon pricing have put us only on a course to stabilize U.S. electricity emis-
sions—a far cry from the precipitous plunge to zero demanded by climate sci-
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sales and under-predict energy efficiency). 
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ence.166 Moreover, the stark partisan divide in the United States is likely to im-
pede substantial additional cross-state policy profusion in this space.167 All of 
this means that the field needs something beyond a sustained focus on refining 
traditional electricity law frameworks to fully decarbonize the U.S. electricity 
sector. Many are now pinning their hopes on a federal clean electricity incentive 
program—a step endorsed by the Biden Administration, but one that is going to 
require careful political calculations to eke its way through Congress.168  
Such a program would be a critical victory toward robust U.S. decarboni-
zation policy—but even so, it represents but one relatively straightforward com-
ponent of necessary structural reforms. The policy space beyond electricity 
decarbonization is far thornier to navigate. Energy law scholars have focused 
less attention on tracing the ways that fossil fuels permeate sectors other than 
electricity. But if the key strategy for decarbonization is cleaning up electricity 
plus electrifying everything, then the question of how—strategically and polit-
ically—to shift entire industrial and human systems from their current infra-
structure to an electrified future merits equal attention. This query, however, 
requires focusing on topics beyond the material characteristics of energy sup-
ply and delivery. 
These cross-sectoral questions are difficult. Even in states leading the 
charge on decarbonization, reducing transportation sector emissions has prov-
en largely intractable.169 The Obama Administration made valiant efforts to 
improve miles per gallon under the CAFE framework only to have these re-
buffed by the Trump Administration.170 New efforts toward decarbonization 
will need to redouble the commitment to figuring out the best strategies to rap-
idly electrify transportation, as well as transition our building stock away from 
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reliance on natural gas for heating and cooking. Similarly, the work of decar-
bonizing industry needs more sustained focus. 
Here, then, is an opening for energy law scholars to redefine what the 
contours of the field are in order to confront a new set of material challenges. 
If the challenge is decarbonization through and through, then the field can no 
longer focus only on physical and market challenges in energy extraction, 
movement, and distribution. Part III discusses ways to expand energy law to 
cover a broader scope of emissions.171 But first, the strictures of energy law 
warrant critique from a different angle.172 
B. The End of the Energy Law Silo 
Decades of climate delay have left us with no good option other than rad-
ical and rapid restructuring of our fossil fuel dominated economy and society. 
Recognizing as much, activists, particularly young activists, are shifting the 
political conversation about what “solving” climate change requires. An in-
creasingly prevalent organizing refrain among progressives is that climate 
change must be seen as one component of a larger struggle against corporate 
domination, rising inequality, and structural racism in the United States. Only 
by uniting these issues to galvanize a cohesive progressive agenda, this think-
ing goes, can true progress on climate change be accomplished. 
As energy law scholars grapple with this new approach, I have frequently 
been involved in conversations involving some version of this question: Are 
these activists right? Do energy law scholars really need to tackle race and ine-
quality as part of the charge of decarbonization? To many, it sounds like a lot 
to add to an already complex agenda. Here, I want to assert two critical reasons 
that I believe our scholarship needs to orient more toward these issues—one to 
do with political economy and the other to do with moral imperative. 
On the topic of political economy, it is difficult to prognosticate about 
what kind of climate legislation, if any, might ultimately pass at the federal 
level. Nevertheless, many pundits are trying to parse potential ways to amass a 
sufficiently robust political coalition in favor of climate policy. One way to 
understand the GND is as a tactical response to past climate politics, rooted in 
concerns that conservative politicians have not been negotiating in good faith. 
The early predominant conservative position on climate change policy was to 
push for market mechanisms as key solutions while refusing to support more 
direct government interventions. But when congressional Democrats finally 
put forward a federal climate bill shaped along these lines in 2009, corporate 
and conservative supporters flipped, opposing action altogether and killing the 
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only serious attempt ever made at federal climate change legislation.173 The 
issue has only become more politicized in the ensuing years, such that many 
on the left see little remaining point in negotiating across the aisle on climate 
change policy.174 
Consequently, the new thinking goes, climate change must be framed as 
an issue that unites everyone across the left, and draws in new working-class 
partners, to agglomerate enough support to move forward.175 GND proponents 
compellingly trace not just the ways that energy facilities disproportionately 
benefit white people and burden people of color, but the more fundamental 
ways in which fossil fuels undergird a neoliberal economic system. This sys-
tem depends on exploitation and oppression, in which racism is used to splinter 
class-based interests and a sense of common purpose, creating tremendous 
precarity that in turn breeds fear of change.176 Thus, as Bill McKibben has ar-
gued, there is no way to enact sufficiently drastic climate policy “without sim-
ultaneously addressing the economic insecurity that makes it so hard for peo-
ple to imagine change.”177 And indeed, California, the state that has accom-
plished the most on climate change, has integrated distributive justice consid-
erations much more thoroughly into its climate change policies than have other 
states.178 
Proponents of the GND believe it presents the kind of galvanizing force 
necessary to jointly tackle the issues of climate change, structural racism, and 
inequality. They are, however, quick to admit that so far it is more of a vision 
than a set of discrete policy proposals.179 As outlined in a resolution Repre-
sentative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Senator Ed Markey introduced to both 
houses of Congress in February 2019, the central demand of the platform is a 
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rapid, cross-sectoral transition to net-zero greenhouse gas emissions.180 To en-
sure that these climate objectives are accompanied by economic and social 
transformation, the GND pairs these reforms with community ownership of 
resources, a federal jobs guarantee, “high-quality health care,” and “affordable, 
safe, and adequate housing” for all Americans.181 
This broad agenda has faced considerable criticism from both conserva-
tives and the more centrist wing of the Democratic party,182 making its political 
fate uncertain. At the state level, it has already met with some success. Follow-
ing California’s lead,183 both New Mexico and New York have recently passed 
climate legislation containing significant economic justice components.184 At 
the federal level, even though President Biden has disavowed being a support-
er of the GND, his climate change strategy has adopted many of its central ten-
ets, including 100% clean electricity by 2035, two trillion dollars in federal 
infrastructure spending, and a dedicated 40% of all federal green spending tar-
geted to disadvantaged communities.185 
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It is not clear whether the Biden Administration will succeed in helping to 
pass federal legislation that accomplishes these aims. Nevertheless, the broad 
contours of these agendas deserve careful consideration and development as 
alternatives—or additions—to a tax, cap-and-trade, or bare mandates approach 
to climate policy. The power of these approaches is that they reframe climate 
change away from being merely a problem that must be dealt with into an op-
portunity for real, durable change for the vast majority of Americans losing out 
in the current economic ordering.186 Even if the GND moniker proves polariz-
ing, its pivot toward focusing on economic opportunity offers room for crea-
tive cross-partisan thinking about new industrial development, economic re-
covery, and infrastructure investment centered on clean energy. 
So far, I have focused on the politics of climate, suggesting that scholars 
should explore the possibility that sufficient progress on climate change might 
require forging broader and deeper coalitions and multi-purpose policy solu-
tions that unite allied progressive causes. But the pivot of young activists to-
wards framing climate change and decarbonization as part of a larger justice 
agenda is more than just a tactical one. It arises from a deep, considered under-
standing of how the issues of energy, environment, inequality, and racism are 
fundamentally interconnected.187 This interconnection creates a deeper moral 
imperative for scholars focused on energy and decarbonization to think about 
how U.S. energy law has historically, and might in the future, exacerbate or 
ameliorate problems of structural racism and inequality. 
As described in Part I, energy law typically traces its origins to the early 
days of fossil fuels. But one could imagine beginning the history of energy law 
in the United States where anthropologist Myles Lennon does, with the Trans-
Atlantic Slave Trade.188 As Lennon compellingly argues, this trade was “the 
first industrial-scale energy infrastructure” that “commoditized human beings 
by violently disciplining them to elicit profitable changes in matter through 
commercialized land transformations.”189 This notion of converting energy into 
a commercialized force, Lennon asserts, then transferred over to fossil fuels, 
but under conditions where Black bodies and other people of color were al-
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ready subjugated and continue to be so.190 At the same time, both slavery and 
the rise of fossil fuels are intimately tied to the history of wealth in this coun-
try, with coal, oil, and railroad barons emerging as the nineteenth century “one 
percent” in a pattern that carries through to utility and oil company executives 
today.191 
I would describe the role of energy law in facilitating the structural racism 
and inequality that has long pervaded the United States as largely one of ne-
glect. To be sure, energy law has often focused on ensuring low consumer 
prices at the expense of producers who might like to pump oil more quickly, or 
monopoly utilities who might like to price gouge their captive customers. But 
the focus on “consumers” or “ratepayers” as a class in energy law serves to 
obscure differences between the people actually doing the consuming and rate-
paying—differences that many Progressives found not only acceptable, but 
justifiable. This attitude continues to undergird energy law’s dominant strate-
gy: “low prices for all!” In this way, energy law is a classic example of pre-
sumptive equality masking inequities and racism. 
Consequently, even as energy law has proven successful at delivering 
electricity, natural gas, and oil to a majority of the U.S. population, it has not 
been able to ensure that everyone has access, that everyone can afford this en-
ergy, or that everyone equally shares in the burdens our fossil-fueled lifestyles 
create. The budding scholarly literature on energy justice has begun to interro-
gate many of these topics, critiquing a host of injustices in the contemporary 
energy system.192 
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These researchers have charted a growing problem of energy poverty, or 
the inability of low-income households to afford adequate energy services.193 
Two-thirds of low-income households in the United States now suffer from a 
high energy burden, defined as spending more than six percent of income on 
energy bills,194 and in some places, low-income residents routinely spend over 
half of their income on energy.195 These high energy burdens force difficult 
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decisions between “heating and eating” and threaten physical and mental 
health and social stability.196 
Research has also revealed how the laws around energy production and 
generation have neglected considerations of racism and inequality.197 Because 
conservation statutes have largely focused on waste minimization, they offer 
limited protection to surface landowners or other community members harmed 
by the efficient production of coal, oil, and gas.198 Nor have state energy siting 
laws done much work to limit inequitable siting of production or generation 
facilities that tend to be concentrated in low-income communities of color.199 
More recent research into clean energy justice suggests that a transformation to 
renewable energy may exacerbate many of these long-standing inequalities, 
rewarding affluent homeowners for putting solar panels on their roofs while 
continuing to shunt the burdens of large renewable energy infrastructure onto 
marginalized rural communities.200 
In the past, energy law’s focus on the material characteristics of fuels 
themselves has allowed it to disavow these challenges. Energy poverty can be 
cast as simply a logical corollary to poverty more generally—a topic outside 
the scope of energy law. Similarly, energy-related health and ecological chal-
lenges, including the energy industry’s egregious pollution of air and water, are 
typically left for environmental law to remedy––or fail to remedy.201 
More recently, several voices in the legal academy have begun to center 
these justice concerns within energy law scholarship. Three recent books, for 
example, explore the intersections of energy law and energy justice on an in-
ternational scale.202 These are welcome additions to a lean literature. Benjamin 
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implications of energy law, see generally Iñigo del Guayo, Lee Godden, Donald D. Zillman, Milton 
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Sovacool and Michael Dworkin’s book has proven particularly influential, as 
many social scientists adopt and apply their eight principles of energy justice 
as an analytical tool.203 But I am concerned that, even here, energy law schol-
ars sometimes fall back on in-the-box solutions. For example, in a chapter on 
utility and energy externalities, Sovacool and Dworkin suggest remedies such 
as the tools of carbon pricing, accurate energy price signals and taxation, and 
environmental bonds.204 These are useful tools, to be sure, but hardly radical 
new ideas for the field. Similarly, Roger Colton suggests that energy efficiency 
programming in the United States could be improved by better incorporating 
equity into considerations of how to allocate utility investments.205 And, he 
insists, such a shift “does not require a revolution in regulatory thinking,” but 
instead “can be pursued using well-accepted legal, economic, and public poli-
cy doctrine.”206 
There is obvious appeal to couching solutions in these terms. Lawyers, as 
a rule, are cautious. We are ostensibly precedent-bound and taught to navigate 
within legal constraints. It is comforting to think that our existing frameworks 
might simply need adjustments to make them fairer. But as Section A suggest-
ed, the need for climate progress on a scale never realized to date is likely to 
require a more fundamental shift in our analysis.207 Shalanda Baker’s formida-
ble article, Anti-Resilience: A Roadmap for Transformational Justice Within 
the Energy System, is one of the few to make this case forcefully.208 Baker 
points out the perversity of efforts to create “resilience” in the energy system, 
or the ability to bounce back from stresses.209 In particular, she argues compel-
lingly against efforts to simply fortify an energy system, and energy laws, that 
have inflicted so much violence upon communities of color and low-income 
communities.210 
                                                                                                                           
Fernando Montoya & José Juan González, Introduction to ENERGY JUSTICE AND ENERGY LAW, supra 
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203 See SOVACOOL & DWORKIN, supra note 192, at 145–56; Jessica Smith & Mette M. High, Ex-
ploring the Anthropology of Energy: Ethnography, Energy and Ethics, ENERGY RSCH. & SOC. SCI., 
Aug. 2017, at 1 (noting the widespread use of this analytical framework in energy justice research). 
204 See SOVACOOL & DWORKIN, supra note 192, at 145–56. 
 205 See generally Roger Colton, The Equities of Efficiency: Distributing Energy Usage Reduction 
Dollars (proposing a economics-based approach for assessing the equity of energy efficiency invest-
ment efforts), in ENERGY JUSTICE, supra note 202, at 105. 
206 Id. at 107; see also Welton, supra note 59, at 639–49 (considering how public utility commis-
sions might incorporate equity within their mission). 
 207 See supra Part II, Section A. 
208 Shalanda H. Baker, Anti-Resilience: A Roadmap for Transformational Justice Within the En-
ergy System, 54 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 6 (2019). 
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Even if one is untroubled by energy law’s past inattention to these issues, 
the field can hardly continue to turn a blind eye to them going forward. The 
reason is simple: decarbonization requires a near-total material transformation 
not just in fuel delivery, but in how we live our lives together. We cannot de-
carbonize without enormous infrastructure investment—whether financed pub-
licly or privately—and without substantial changes in life-shaping determi-
nants including settlement patterns, modes of mobility, and a collective reex-
amination of what makes for a satisfying life.211 Because of the wide-ranging 
changes that decarbonization demands, it presents a critical juncture for either 
addressing inequality and structural racism, or shunting aside these concerns 
for another generation or more. 
A focus on these intensive material realities of decarbonization casts en-
ergy law’s debate over policy instruments in a new light. Many harbor an un-
derstandable hope that the Biden Administration might yet achieve a centrist, 
market-based solution to climate change that sidesteps these messy distribu-
tional issues.212 To be fair, some carbon tax proposals suggest eliminating re-
gressivity through rebates or dividends to the poor—a good accommodation, 
but hardly the kind of structural fix that GND advocates have in mind.213 I 
think it is worth making clear, however, that when energy law scholars, policy 
                                                                                                                           
211 See JEDEDIAH PURDY, THIS LAND IS OUR LAND: THE STRUGGLE FOR A NEW COMMON-
WEALTH, at xxiii (2019) (suggesting that to forge a new politics, we must “ask what wealth itself is 
and what is the value of life”); id. at 82 (discussing the importance of infrastructure to our species 
today); Frank W. Geels, Benjamin K. Sovacool, Tim Schwanen & Steve Sorrell, Sociotechnical Tran-
sitions for Deep Decarbonization, 357 SCI., Sept. 22, 2017, at 1242 (“Rapid and deep decarbonization 
requires transformation of sociotechnical systems—the interlinked mix of technologies, infrastruc-
tures, organizations, markets, regulations, and user practices that together deliver societal functions 
such as personal mobility.”). 
 212 For articles expressing this hope, see Matthew DeBord, Joe Biden’s Election Could Give Elon 
Musk the Carbon Tax He’s Wanted for Years, INSIDER (Nov. 14, 2020), https://www.businessinsider.
com/elon-musk-might-get-a-carbon-tax-from-president-biden-2020-11 [https://perma.cc/DL6H-VC48]; 
Matthew Green, U.S. Could Adopt Carbon Tax Under a Biden Presidency, Ex-Fed Chair Yellen Says, 
REUTERS (Oct. 8, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-climate-tax/u-s-could-adopt-carbon-
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482X]; Bob Inglis, Opinion, Joe Biden Can Work with Conservatives on Climate Change. Many of 
Them Are Ready to Act., USA TODAY, https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2020/12/10/how-joe-
biden-can-work-conservatives-climate-change-column/6505381002/ [https://perma.cc/R3Z4-45XD] 
(Dec. 10, 2020, 12:38 PM). 
213 See generally CHAD STONE, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, THE DESIGN AND IMPLE-
MENTATION OF POLICIES TO PROTECT LOW-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS UNDER A CARBON TAX (2015), 
https://www.cbpp.org/research/climate-change/the-design-and-implementation-of-policies-to-protect-
low-income-households [https://perma.cc/E7Y7-95P3] (advocating for rebates to benefit low-income 
households against the impacts of climate change); JOSEPH ROSENBERG, ERIC TODER & CHENXI LU, 
TAX POL’Y CTR., DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPLICATION OF A CARBON TAX (Noah Kaufman ed., 2018), https://
www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/distributional-implications-carbon-tax/full [https://perma.cc/
7UKB-57MR] (arguing that the effect of distributing the proceeds from a climate tax may insulate 
vulnerable populations). 
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advocates, or politicians champion decarbonization bills that fundamentally 
overhaul U.S. infrastructure but do little to address structural distributional and 
racial inequities, they are making a conscious choice to lock in these inequi-
ties. In other words, just because gross inequity is the status quo does not mean 
it is a defensible choice during conversations about what the shape of infra-
structure and social structure should look like over the next several genera-
tions. To pretend that it is the GND, or problematic progressives, who inject 
equity and racial justice considerations into an otherwise pure climate conver-
sation is itself a convenient fiction.214 
In sum, this Part has suggested that energy law scholars need to approach 
decarbonization not from within the bounds of existing energy law, but instead 
from exigent planetary imperatives. If we begin here, however, it quickly be-
comes apparent that decarbonization is inescapably bound up with the perva-
sive issues of inequality and racism. For these reasons, I am eager to see schol-
ars explore and develop the legal and policy contours of a climate change pro-
gram that embraces these interconnections. But as tactically and ethically im-
portant as these new directions may be, they also pose a challenging agenda 
for energy law scholars who are used to operating within more technocratic 
domains. How exactly should we proceed if we accept the arguments of activ-
ists who insist that decarbonization be linked to larger challenges of systemic 
racism and inequality? 
What we should do, Part III argues, is support this movement with a new 
generation of scholarship that rises to the scale of the challenge presented by 
climate change. Energy law scholars have considerable expertise they could 
offer in support of more capacious decarbonization agendas. But to do so, the 
field will have to leave the zone of tweaks and instead ask what an energy law 
centered around the imperatives and technologies of today might look like. 
III. PUSHING THE BOUNDS OF ENERGY LAW 
The climate change solution that can be derived from twentieth-century 
energy law may be nearing its end point. What the field now needs is an en-
larged legal imaginary that matches the central material challenges the field 
confronts today. This new materiality demands less, and less unequal, energy 
consumption, dramatically altered energy production, and rapid action. To help 
achieve these goals, this final Part advocates for expanding energy law schol-
arship in three directions, which it elucidates in turn. Section A calls for more 
                                                                                                                           
214 See, e.g., Heather Caygle & Sarah Ferris, Dem Leaders Warn Liberal Rhetoric Could Blow 
Georgia Races, POLITICO, https://www.politico.com/news/2020/11/05/house-democrats-warn-caucus-
left-434428 [https://perma.cc/QM6L-TMHR] (Nov. 5, 2020, 5:06 PM) (noting that in reality much of 
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attention to the politics impeding technologically feasible rapid decarboniza-
tion.215 Section B highlights the importance of interrogating the intersection of 
energy policy with the pressing priorities of inequality and systemic racism.216 
Finally, Section C advocates for an expanded notion of what counts as “ener-
gy” worthy of attention from scholars of the topic.217 
A. Politics and Power as Central to the Analysis 
Most economists emphasize the role of accurate price signals in decar-
bonizing the energy system.218 And indeed, it is hard to argue with the basic 
premise that energy prices should better reflect true costs, including the costs 
of carbon. But the existence of pricing flaws in energy is not new infor-
mation.219 Yet economists have made limited real-world headway in redesign-
ing retail rates and internalizing externalities. 
The idea of fixing the energy system through pricing reforms has not 
failed theoretically—it has failed politically.220 There is ample evidence at this 
point that electricity decarbonization—at least up to ninety percent—is not 
only technologically possible, but might deliver electricity at lower cost by 
2035.221 There is simply not the political will, at least not yet, to adopt the pol-
icies needed to propel this transition in Congress or most sub-jurisdictions in 
                                                                                                                           
 215 See infra Part III, Section A. 
 216 See infra Part III, Section B. 
 217 See infra Part III, Section C. 
218 See, e.g., Kenneth Gillingham & James H. Stock, The Cost of Reducing Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions, J. ECON. PERSPS., Fall 2018, at 53, 53 (suggesting that basic economic incentives will 
encourage successful, and efficient reduction of greenhouse gas emissions if the marginal benefit 
equals the marginal cost). 
219 See, e.g., Harvey Averch & Leland L. Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory Con-
straint, 52 AM. ECON. REV. 1052, 1068 (1962) (suggesting that rate-regulated firms over-invest in 
capital projects on which they receive a guaranteed rate of return). For additional literature regarding 
carbon taxes and energy pricing see supra notes 123–125. 
220 See generally DANNY CULLENWARD & DAVID G. VICTOR, MAKING CLIMATE POLICY WORK 
(2020) (arguing that market-based incentives are insufficient to address the climate crisis); Alice 
Kaswan, Carbon Pricing: Essential But Insufficient (Univ. S.F. Sch. L., Research Paper No. 2020-11, 
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perma.cc/8RK5-7GJS] (advocating for an innovative solution beyond carbon pricing to address cli-
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221 See GOLDMAN SCH. OF PUB. POL’Y, UNIV. OF CAL. BERKELEY, 2035 THE REPORT: PLUMMET-
ING SOLAR, WIND, AND BATTERY COSTS CAN ACCELERATE OUR CLEAN ELECTRICITY FUTURE 4 
(2020), https://www.2035report.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/2035-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/
8RLD-JLSX] (providing a high-level and optimistic overview of alternative energies). 
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the United States.222 After all, solutions like carbon taxes or cap-and-trade pro-
grams are only useful if they can survive the legislative process.223 
For this reason, whereas the first generation of energy law scholarship to 
incorporate climate change focused on tools,224 the next generation must focus 
on tactics. Fossil fuel companies and utilities have a tremendous amount of 
structural power that goes unattended in technical discussions of decarboniza-
tion tools. Utilities can and do use their combined economic and political clout 
to block reforms at the state and federal levels and to roll back progress made 
in combating climate change.225 Accordingly, to rise to the scope and scale of 
the current climate crisis, energy law must become much more agonistic, ready 
to confront the “existential politics” that climate change presents.226 
The notion that utilities and fossil fuel companies might use their power 
to privilege profits over the general welfare is no shocking revelation––quite 
the contrary. Progressives at the turn of the twentieth century were keenly at-
tuned to the challenges of consolidated and monopoly power, in fact, cabining 
such power was a key goal of public utility commissions and rate regulation.227 
Over a century later, we know that this model has strengths and weaknesses. It 
has largely kept prices low and supplies ample. Nevertheless, although not as 
thoroughly captured as the public choice theorists of the 1970s asserted, the 
field is rife with well-documented regulatory and legislative capture.228 
Energy law has not yet developed an adequate set of responses to contend 
with the level of capture in the field—a prerequisite to implementing the kinds 
of incentive reforms popular among energy law scholars. There is, of course, a 
risk in dignifying concerns of capture. The conservative response to these alle-
                                                                                                                           
222 See supra note 168 (discussing the advocacy for a federal clean energy standard); Healy & 
Barry, supra note 192, at 452 (describing the energy transition as “a deeply political struggle”). 
223 David Leonhardt, Opinion, Less Hope, More Change, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2019), https://
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gations is to impugn the ability of government to ever rise above these tenden-
cies.229 But there is an underdeveloped potential progressive response to these 
critiques as well, which is to ask: how can energy institutions be strengthened 
or reformed to act as the guardians of the evolving public interest?230 
It is time for energy law scholars to return to the best of the field’s Pro-
gressive roots and pay more attention to these structural challenges.231 Scholars 
must diagnose what features of modern utility regulation allow for structural 
dominance in the twenty-first century and identify what must be done to com-
bat this barrier to transformational change in the field. The scholarship of Wil-
liam Boyd and William Novak provides a useful starting point.232 These schol-
ars argue for the continued vitality of the concept of public utility that they 
describe not as a convoluted set of commission regulations but as “a normative 
effort,”233 or an “idea” once capable of rousing the very best minds to puzzle 
through the challenge of how to harness business in the public interest.234 
In the spirit of this broad inquiry, energy law scholars need to focus, 
again, on institutions. If politics is the problem, scholarship on institutional 
design will prove more potent than additional scholarship on substance. And 
so, scholars might now ask: why are the forms of control that we set up to 
manage the energy industry—namely commissions—not enough to fully regu-
late utilities in the broader public interest? Why have so many of these com-
missions not implemented the host of excellent ideas for rationalizing electrici-
ty pricing and reducing consumption offered to them by the academy? Such 
analysis could lead to recommended antecedent institutional reforms that may 
be more politically feasible than direct climate change policy.235 
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Another area relating to power and politics that is ripe for more research 
is the level of corporate agglomeration in the energy sector. Facilitated by the 
2005 repeal of New Deal-era protections limiting the size of these companies, 
the energy sector has recently reached the highest levels of consolidation since 
before the New Deal.236 As of 2016, there were fifty remaining utility systems, 
down from hundreds a few decades earlier.237 Experts are still working to ana-
lyze the effects of this rapid reconsolidation, but one can surmise that concen-
trating power in a limited number of companies may not help with problems of 
capture or political dominance.238 Tackling the regulation of consolidation may 
thus open up space for more substantive progress on climate change. 
More broadly, at a moment of change in the industry nearly as monumen-
tal as the early days of the electricity grid, it is worth probing more thoroughly 
the idea of public utility as a project. One of the strengths of public utility, writ 
large, is its ability to socialize infrastructure costs—a vital component of the 
clean energy transition. But that ability has become cramped under public utili-
ty rate regulation by narrow in-fighting about cross-subsidization among clas-
ses and categories of consumers.239 
If the goal is developing clean energy technologies and related infrastruc-
ture in the public interest, and against incumbent interests, forms other than 
commission-regulated utilities might prove the best agents of change. For ex-
ample, Bernie Sanders proposed that federal clean energy authorities, modeled 
after the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), may prove a vital strategy for rap-
id clean energy infrastructure deployment.240 “Public options” of this sort241 are 
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often derided based on the historical record of the TVA on clean energy, which 
is, in short, abysmal.242 But simply pointing to the historical record of the TVA 
is an incomplete critique. A federally-owned utility specifically charged with 
deploying clean energy might behave quite differently from the TVA, which 
has long seen its mission as conflicting with clean energy development. We 
might also interrogate whether we have the right agencies overseeing the tran-
sition, or whether new or differently constituted entities could better perform 
this role.243 
A focus on politics also demands more creative and careful thinking about 
how to cabin the political might of the oil and gas sectors that are fighting 
against their obsolescence. Energy law scholars have made limited headway in 
examining how to manage the clash between the U.S. fracking boom and plane-
tary decarbonization imperatives. That is likely because there are few options for 
resolving this tension within current energy laws. But to ignore this issue pre-
sents peril. As observed by Noel Healy and John Barry, scientifically recom-
mended levels of decarbonization “necessitate[] leaving approximately 33% of 
oil reserves, 50% of gas reserves, and over 80% of current coal reserves in the 
ground by 2050.”244 Meanwhile, fossil fuel companies continue to seek new re-
serves that would make these percentages even more challenging. Similarly, the 
International Energy Agency recently made headlines by proclaiming that na-
tions around the world need to cease approving new coal-fired power plants and 
oil and gas fields in 2021, in order to avert catastrophic climate change.245 These 
                                                                                                                           
pansive view of the “public option,” a uniquely American phenomenon that utilizes public resources 
without invading “private provision”). 
242 See, e.g., Stephen Smith & Maggie Shober, TVA Deceives the Public and the Press with Mis-
leading Claim of Solar Commitment, CLEANENERGY.ORG (Sept. 19, 2019), https://cleanenergy.org/
blog/tva-deceives-the-public-and-the-press-with-misleading-claim-of-solar-commitment/ [https://
perma.cc/SJK4-MXXN] (arguing that TVA’s announcement that it was adding 14 gigawatts of solar 
to its system was misleading because it only budgeted for 5.5 gigawatts, and that this demonstrates 
TVA is not serious about sustainable energy); Daniel Tait & Joe Smyth, TVA Attempts to Chain Local 
Power Companies to Longer Contracts in Effort to Prevent Defection Risk, ENERGY & POL’Y INST. 
(Sept. 22, 2019), https://www.energyandpolicy.org/tva-local-power-companies-defection/ [https://perma.
cc/C9YH-VSHD] (describing barriers that TVA has erected to local communities’ efforts to adopt 
renewables). 
243 See, e.g., Arianna Skibell, Biden’s Clean Electricity Plan May Hinge on FERC, E&E NEWS: 
ENERGYWIRE (Aug. 24, 2020), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1063712293 [https://perma.cc/2V6H-
JL3D] (noting suggestions from Elizabeth Warren and Bernie Sanders to turn FERC into a renewable 
energy agency); see also Sharon B. Jacobs, Agency Genesis and the Energy Transition, 121 COLUM. 
L. REV. 835, 836–861 (2021) (discussing how and why new agencies are created through the lens of 
state energy policy). 
244 Healy & Barry, supra note 192, at 453. 
245 Brad Plumer, Nations Must Drop Fossil Fuels, Fast, World Energy Body Warns, N.Y. TIMES, 
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figures suggest that the only way for the planet not to overshoot viable warming 
limits is for these companies to suffer the loss of planned profits.246 
In October 2020, during the most substantive exchange on climate change 
ever in a presidential debate, President Biden committed to “transition from 
the oil industry,” acknowledging this as a “big statement.”247 Supporting this 
goal will require a two-fold effort from energy law scholars. First, we need 
fresh ideas about how the law might directly target fossil fuel extraction and 
production.248 Second, we need more robust thinking about how to support the 
interests of fossil fuel workers, even when the interests of their companies en-
dure legislative challenges. A recent article by Alexandra Klass exemplifies the 
kind of creativity needed on the production side of energy law.249 In Eminent 
Domain Law as Climate Policy, Klass argues for overhauling state eminent 
domain laws to favor clean energy projects while disfavoring fossil fuel devel-
opment.250 FERC Chair Richard Glick and General Counsel Matt Christiansen 
have also made the case for altering pipeline approval standards under the 
Natural Gas Act to account for climate change—a change that is well within 
their professional domain.251 Steps like these, which chip away at the power of 
fossil fuel companies, will be critical building blocks to larger structural inter-
ventions. 
On the topic of the fossil fuel workforce, energy law scholars could add 
considerably to the conversations underway in labor law and rural law about 
how to ensure a “just transition” for these workers.252 For example, energy law 
scholars might consider: is there space within public utility law to support 
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(2019). 
252 See generally David J. Doorey, A Law of Just Transitions?: Putting Labor Law to Work on Cli-
mate Change (Osgoode Hall L. Sch., Legal Stud. Rsch. Paper Series, Research Paper No. 35, 2016), 
https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer-https://www.google.com/&http
sredir=1&article=1166&context=olsrps [https://perma.cc/74R2-5V8Y] (advocating for a reformula-
tion of the term “just transition” to include labor law and environmental law); Ann M. Eisenberg, Just 
Transitions, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 273 (2019) (assessing the use of the term “just transition” to describe 
shifting to a green economy, with a focus on impacts to labor). 
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transitional programs for utility employees? How might state or federal efforts 
to limit fossil fuel exploration or production be coupled with programs to aid 
affected workers? How might revenue-generating climate change policies be 
harnessed for just transition purposes? Again, a focus on the politics of such 
reforms will be key to the success of decarbonization and, in particular, the 
ability to splinter the very different interests of fossil fuel workers from those 
of fossil fuel executives and corporations. 
The final point regarding politics relates back to the hopes of some for a 
nonantagonistic, centrist, market-based solution to emerge in the Biden Ad-
ministration.253 In analyzing and potentially supporting these solutions, schol-
ars should carefully consider how such legislation fits within the material exi-
gencies of the moment—that is, the need to decarbonize completely by 2050. 
Here, the growing literature on policy feedback might prove instrumental.254 
So too might the emerging law and political economy framework, whose pro-
ponents suggest a methodology that goes beyond policy feedback to examine 
broadly the ways in which politics shape the economy and the laws that under-
gird it.255 When analyzing policies like a new potential carbon tax, scholars 
should ask: is this proposal in accord with planetary imperatives? If not, is 
there a plausible theory of how the instrument will induce ratcheting over time 
based on the parties involved and their track records on climate? If not, then 
caution is due, as meliorative half-measures might damage more than they as-
sist.256 
This Section has suggested broadening the analytical lens of energy law 
scholarship to focus more on politics and power. But especially in the present 
political moment, this pivot alone is inadequate. The field also needs a deeper 
reckoning and consequent broadening into less comfortable analytical terrain. 
                                                                                                                           
253 See Josh Siegel, Here’s What Congressional Republicans Are Thinking on Climate Following 
the Election, WASH. EXAM’R (Nov. 12, 2020), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/policy/energy/
heres-what-congressional-republicans-are-thinking-on-climate-following-the-election [https://perma.
cc/8BL9-Z5NM] (“Republicans remain opposed to any policies that would reduce fossil fuel use 
. . . .”). For a collection of scholarly works on the carbon tax, see supra note 125. 
254 See supra note 11 (gathering sources approaching climate change policy from a policy feed-
back angle). 
255 See Purdy et al., supra note 19, at 1792 (describing law as “the essential connective tissue be-
tween political judgment and economic order”). 
256 See David Roberts, “All of the Above,” VOLTS (Dec. 10, 2020), https://www.volts.wtf/p/all-of-
the-above [https://perma.cc/GU7R-JQAF] (arguing that legislation focused on carbon capture and 
storage—a plausible centrist strategy—might further empower the fossil fuel industry without trans-
forming the energy sector toward much-needed clean electrification); see also Kevin Crowley & 
Akshat Rathi, Exxon Holds Back on Technology That Could Slow Climate Change, BLOOMBERG 
GREEN (Jan. 8, 2021), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2020-12-07/exxon-s-xom-carbon-
capture-project-stalled-by-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/722R-ELEV] (reporting interview suggesting 
that oil companies push carbon capture and storage “to help justify ongoing operations and persuade 
regulators not to intervene”). 
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B. Race, Inequality, and Energy 
Both as a matter of politics and principle, progressives increasingly insist 
that “there can be no climate justice without racial and economic justice.”257 This 
resolve forms the backbone of a new political movement. It can be difficult to 
discern what role energy law scholars should play in this conversation. The new 
movement is centered on raising the voices and ideas of affected communities, 
thereby demanding something different and difficult of the scholarly communi-
ty.258 Nevertheless, there is much support work that energy law scholars could do 
to help these communities link their goals to viable and fruitful policy reforms. A 
better accounting of these linkages could expand energy law in two meaningful 
directions. Subsection 1 details how energy law scholars might push the field to 
prioritize and frame reform proposals differently. Subsection 2 explores the via-
bility and efficacy of more radical institutional reforms. 
1. Adopting an Intersectional Framework for Energy Law Proposals 
There is an understandable tendency to filter all reform proposals in ener-
gy law almost exclusively through the lens of economic efficiency.259 Why 
promote investment in energy efficient appliances? Because they cost less over 
time.260 Why allow net metering of rooftop solar? Because “value-of-solar” 
studies show that net-metered energy brings more benefits than costs to the 
system.261 Why allow demand response technologies to participate in whole-
sale energy markets? Because, as the Supreme Court has explained, these 
peak-demand-reduction programs are “all about reducing wholesale rates.”262 
The modern ratemaking formula is the cause for much of this narrow 
framing. It is difficult to articulate compelling theories of justice within this 
paradigm’s emphases on cost-causation and efficiency. But rapid decarboniza-
                                                                                                                           
257 Press Release, Wilderness Soc’y, 39 Groups Launch Diverse Coalition for Clean Energy and 
Healthy Communities (June 25, 2020) (on file with author), https://www.wilderness.org/articles/press-
release/39-groups-launch-diverse-coalition-clean-energy-and-healthy-communities# [https://perma.
cc/LK5J-Q6TG] (quoting Ken Berlin, President and CEO of the Climate Reality Project). 
258 Cf. Akbar et al., supra note 22, at 826 (calling for a turn to “movement law” that “approaches 
scholarly thinking and writing about law, justice, and social change as work done in solidarity with 
social movements, local organizing, and other forms of collective struggle”). 
259 Cf. Purdy et al., supra note 19, at 1784, 1790 (chronicling a broader twentieth-century trend to 
filter legal proposals through a lens of efficiency that “encases ‘the market’ from claims of justice”). 
260 KATHERINE FRIEDRICH, MAGGIE ELDRIDGE, DAN YORK, PATTI WITTE & MARTY KUSHLER, 
AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON., SAVING ENERGY COST-EFFECTIVELY 15 (2009), 
https://www.aceee.org/sites/default/files/publications/researchreports/U092.pdf [https://perma.cc/
Q5KF-SKB4] (evaluating energy efficiency for its cost-effectiveness and explaining how commis-
sions prioritize it when it is the least-cost resource). 
261 Value of Solar Tariffs, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB’Y, https://www.nrel.gov/state-local-
tribal/basics-value-of-solar-tariffs.html [https://perma.cc/M2ZK-Y9SY]. 
262 FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 577 U.S. 260, 279 (2016). 
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tion is going to require new legislative proposals, and possibly new or re-
formed bodies to carry them out. In thinking about the future of the field, then, 
scholars should consider moving beyond the constraints of present-day rate-
making to think and talk about proposals in ways that highlight their intersec-
tionality, not suppress it.263 
In particular, energy law scholars might more explicitly and expansively 
explore the links between the energy system, racism, and inequality. For ex-
ample, the same infrastructure that causes transportation to be the highest-
emitting sector in the United States also has a long history of institutional rac-
ism. During the heyday of federal interstate construction in the 1950s, inter-
states were frequently built so as to destroy Black communities and keep Black 
and white neighborhoods apart.264 Today, these same highways running 
through communities of color create pockets of concentrated auto emissions 
linked to higher rates of many severe and chronic illnesses.265 Similarly, the 
suburban infrastructure that proliferated during this time was enabled by feder-
al and local policies designed to limit Black homeownership and maintain seg-
regated communities.266 All of these policies contributed to today’s racial 
wealth gap and ingrained patterns of neighborhood segregation. President 
Donald Trump clearly understood the persistence of these patterns when he 
attempted to appeal to voters by marrying racism and climate denial through 
                                                                                                                           
263 See PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY’S RECOVERY 
ACT SPENDING 7–8 (2009), https://www.issuelab.org/resources/11536/11536.pdf [https://perma.cc/
HX9Y-MF69]. Energy and inequality have been successfully linked in recent legislation: in the wake 
of the great recession, Congress provided a short-term five-fold increase in the amount of money it 
typically gives to weatherize low-income houses, as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act. Id. 
264 HIGHWAY ROBBERY: TRANSPORTATION RACISM AND NEW ROUTES TO EQUITY (Robert D. 
Bullard, Glenn S. Johnson, Angel O. Torres eds., 2004); David Karas, Highway to Inequity: The Dis-
parate Impact of the Interstate Highway System on Poor and Minority Communities in American 
Cities, NEW VISIONS PUB. AFFS., Spring 2015, at 9; Kevin M. Kruse, What Does a Traffic Jam in 
Atlanta Have to do with Segregation? Quite a Lot., N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Aug. 14, 2019), https://www.
nytimes.com/interactive/2019/08/14/magazine/traffic-atlanta-segregation.html [https://perma.cc/LN6D-
ERAL]; Alana Semuels, The Role of Highways in American Poverty, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 18, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/03/role-of-highways-in-american-poverty/474282/ 
[https://perma.cc/5GFE-HUEW]. 
265 Lee Paddock & Achinthi Vithanage, Collaborating with Underserved Communities to Con-
tribute to Decarbonization in the United States, in ENERGY JUSTICE AND ENERGY LAW, supra note 
192, at 105; Ann E. Carlson, The Clean Air Act’s Blind Spot: Microclimates and Hotspot Pollution, 
65 UCLA L. REV. 1036, 1036 (2018) (describing how microclimates of pollution, which are not cap-
tured by the Clean Air Act’s design, “exacerbate asthma, increase respiratory and cardiac deaths, may 
cause developmental problems in children, and increase cancer risks”). 
266 See generally ROTHSTEIN, supra note 22 (providing an overview of policies at the federal, 
state, and local level that supported and advanced racial segregation). 
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dog whistle rhetoric such as “[t]hey want to eliminate single-family zoning, 
bringing who knows into your suburbs.”267 
Racism and inequality are not topics that arise often in energy law, given 
its material focus on producing, moving, and delivering fossil fuels. But these 
topics are intimately related to an emerging set of energy policy challenges 
because decarbonization policy relies, in large part, on shifting the ways peo-
ple settle and convene together to reduce building and transportation emis-
sions.268 This draws out an important synergy: antiracist housing policy and 
antiracist transportation policy share considerable overlap with decarboniza-
tion strategies for these sectors. 
Thus, scholars should spend more time considering what these interrela-
tionships suggest about decarbonization priorities. For example, rezoning for 
density has the potential to address structural racism even as it reduces carbon 
emissions from the building and transportation sectors. Electrification of pub-
lic transportation may deserve prioritization over the buildout of electric vehi-
cle infrastructure because it transforms both the landscapes and the daily lives 
for communities of color.269 Net metering and community solar programs can 
redress energy poverty and build neighborhood solidarity around decarboniza-
tion—which may at times make them worthwhile initiatives even if they are 
more expensive than utility-scale renewables.270 More broadly, analysts might 
begin measuring decarbonization initiatives not only by their total carbon re-
duction, but also by their co-benefits and distributional consequences, such as 
the alleviation of conventional air pollutants in historically overburdened 
neighborhoods.271 Currently, however, not enough scholars are evaluating poli-
                                                                                                                           
267 See Lauren Sommer, Why Sprawl Could Be the Next Big Climate Change Battle, NPR (Aug. 
6, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/08/06/812199726/why-sprawl-could-be-the-next-big-climate-
change-battle [https://perma.cc/4YFS-ENQD]. 
268 KATE ARONOFF, ALYSSA BATTISTONI, DANIEL ALDANA COHEN & THEA RIOFRANCOS, A 
PLANET TO WIN: WHY WE NEED A GREEN NEW DEAL 53 (2019); JESSICA LEUNG, CTR. CLIMATE & 
ENERGY SOLUTIONS, DECARBONIZING U.S. BUILDINGS 1 (2018), https://www.c2es.org/wp-content/
uploads/2018/06/innovation-buildings-background-brief-07-18.pdf [https://perma.cc/UT7A-DYG4] 
(“Fossil-fuel combustion attributed to residential and commercial buildings accounts for roughly 29 
percent of total U.S. greenhouse gas emissions.”). 
269 See HIGHWAY ROBBERY, supra note 264, at 4 (documenting how people of color use public 
transportation at higher rates and how public transportation commutes are much longer than car com-
mutes on average); cf. Paddock & Vithanage, supra note 265, at 105 (describing barriers that make it 
harder for low-income communities to take advantage of electric vehicles). 
270 See Nikki Luke & Nik Heynen, Community Solar as Energy Reparations: Abolishing Petro-
Racial Capitalism in New Orleans, 72 AM. Q. 603, 605 (2020) (conceptualizing “emancipatory energy 
futures” as a sort of reparations for Black communities). 
271 See REBECCA BRATSPIES, DATA FOR PROGRESS, STRUGGLING TO BREATHE: ASTHMA, POL-
LUTION, AND THE FIGHT FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 3 (2020), https://www.filesforprogress.org/
memos/struggling-to-breathe.pdf [https://perma.cc/67ME-WKDW] (describing disparate rates of air-
pollution-induced asthma across the United States); Carlson, supra note 265, at 1040. 
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cy ideas or efforts across the multiple frames of decarbonizing the economy, 
redressing racial discrimination, and reducing inequality.272 Efforts in this vein 
could go a long way toward helping flesh out and test key elements of broader 
and deeper reforms. 
2. Promoting Energy Democracy 
A greater understanding of the joint legacy of fossil fuels and racism also 
demands an inquiry into how to better center long-marginalized voices in the 
shaping of energy institutions.273 Black Lives Matter activists have pointed out 
the ways in which the horrific utterance, “I can’t breathe,” relates to both po-
lice violence and violence perpetrated by energy injustices.274 Communities 
that have borne the brunt of this violence understandably harbor distrust of both 
police and energy institutions, which makes them more interested in dismantling 
these institutions than reforming them.275 Today, regulatory proceedings regard-
ing energy infrastructure routinely exclude communities of color, who are seen 
as having limited useful knowledge to contribute.276 This marginalization then 
relegates these communities to the dual roles of ratepayers and sacrifice zones, 
disproportionately hosting the polluting infrastructure necessary to fuel society 
and bearing the brunt of climate impacts.277 Conversely, activists note that en-
                                                                                                                           
272 For notable exceptions to this statement, see generally Shalanda H. Baker, Unlocking the En-
ergy Commons: Expanding Community Energy Generation, in LAW AND POLICY FOR A NEW ECON-
OMY 211 (Melissa K. Scanlan ed., 2017); Kaswan, supra note 21; Mormann, supra note 21; Outka, 
supra note 21. Uma Outka and Alice Kaswan have done pioneering work on incorporating justice 
considerations into clean energy policy. Kaswan, supra note 21, at 111–19; Outka, supra note 21, at 
818–24. Shalanda Baker has considered the promise of community energy in this regard. Baker, supra 
note 272. Felix Mormann has proposed means for evaluating equity as a guiding criterion in renewa-
ble energy program design. Mormann, supra note 21, at 346–48. 
273 Baker, supra note 208, at 43; Lennon, supra note 188, at 22 (observing how “solar’s material 
capacity to transform the grid coheres smoothly with [Black Lives Matter]’s vision for communal 
self-determination (as opposed to top-down governance)”). 
274 Alexandria Herr, An Illustrated Guide to Police Brutality and Pollution, GRIST (Sept. 9, 
2020), https://grist.org/justice/illustration-what-does-the-fossil-fuel-industry-have-to-do-with-police-
brutality/ [https://perma.cc/SC5X-9B7C]; see also Lennon, supra note 188, at 21 (noting that activists 
in support of energy democracy carry “I can’t breathe” signs “to connect the incidence of fossil fuel 
pollution and asthma in black communities with police brutality and the systematic de-mattering of 
black lives”). 
 275 See Defund the Police, MOVEMENT FOR BLACK LIVES (M4BL), https://m4bl.org/defund-the-
police/ [https://perma.cc/ED5L-CW3G] (presenting the defunding movement as one intended to en-
hance safety and accountability). 
276 Lennon, supra note 188, at 19; Welton & Eisen, supra note 21, at 342–55 (documenting 
community group participation rates in clean energy rulemakings at public utility commissions). 
277 See Hopkins, supra note 190 (connecting the fact that climate change often has substantial im-
pacts in areas that society is willing to sacrifice, where “disposable people” live). 
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ergy regulators give limited priority to the promotion of clean energy technol-
ogies in these same communities.278 
These alienating experiences with energy institutions have caused activ-
ists to call for “energy democracy” as a response to systemic energy injustic-
es.279 Groups advocating for democratic reforms articulate their vision as “a 
shift from the corporate, centralized fossil fuel economy to one that is gov-
erned by communities, is designed on the principle of no harm to the environ-
ment, supports local economies, and contributes to the health and well-being 
for all peoples.”280 
To this end, the material characteristics of renewable energy might prove 
advantageous. Unlike fossil fuel-fired electricity generation, which is best done 
at large scale, renewable energy is far more modular. Wind farms can range 
from a single turbine to seven thousand.281 Solar arrays range from rooftop 
scale to 1.7 million panels spread out over an area four times the size of Cen-
tral Park.282 This variation in scale creates opportunities for projects of multi-
ple sizes, from traditional, utility-scale endeavors, to community-based pro-
jects, to microgrids and off-grid operations.283 In turn, this scalability opens up 
possibilities for different ownership structures and forms of institutional over-
sight, such as more community control over energy and more equitable owner-
ship of distributed energy resources.284 The question for energy law scholars, 
                                                                                                                           
278 See Lennon, supra note 188, at 22–23 (noting the disparate impacts of climate change on vul-
nerable communities, who are similarly de-prioritized for clean energy investment). 
 279 Climate Justice Alliance, https://climatejusticealliance.org/workgroup/energy-democracy/ [https://
perma.cc/G24G-UTAC]. See also Invest-Divest, Movement for Black Lives (M4BL), https://m4bl.org/
policy-platforms/invest-divest/ [https://perma.cc/72G6-DAXA] (calling for “investment in community-
based sustainable energy solutions”); Energy Democracy Project, https://energydemocracy.us [https://
perma.cc/53SH-95SQ] (same). See generally Denise Fairchild & Al Weinrub, Introduction to ENER-
GY DEMOCRACY: ADVANCING EQUITY IN CLEAN ENERGY SOLUTIONS 1 (Denise Fairchild & Al 
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 280 Climate Justice Alliance, supra note 279. 
281 Top 10 Biggest Wind Farms, POWERTECHNOLOGY, https://www.power-technology.com/
features/feature-biggest-wind-farms-in-the-world-texas/ [https://perma.cc/M3LM-3ULA] (Jan. 20, 
2021). 
282 Scott Becker, A Look into America’s Largest Solar Farm, SOLSTICE (Mar. 22, 2019), 
https://solstice.us/solstice-blog/a-look-into-americas-largest-solar-farm/ [https://perma.cc/9XFK-
SDTW]. 
283 See KEVIN BREHM, THOMAS KOCK BLANK & LEAH MOSIER, ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., PRO-
GRESS AND POTENTIAL FOR COMMUNITY-SCALE SOLAR (2018), https://rmi.org/wp-content/uploads/
2018/04/Progress-and-Potential-for-Community-Scale-Solar.pdf [https://perma.cc/HVV5-GWCM] 
(pointing out how solar is growing and how it will present opportunities for everyday people who 
adopt the technology). 
284 See Reames, supra note 200, at 2 (discussing disparities in rooftop solar); Welton, supra note 
50, 285–89 (discussing public ownership). 
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then, is how to adapt institutional analysis to accommodate these different mate-
rial characteristics and the long-ignored material needs of communities of color. 
Many scholars of energy policy remain wary of the energy democracy 
agenda, viewing it as too locally focused, too expensive, and no panacea for 
racial justice.285 These are logical objections from the angle of maximum effi-
ciency.286 But these critiques miss much of what energy democracy activists 
seek. Decentralizing energy decision-making is, in this conversation, centrally 
about empowering communities to protect their own health and welfare and to 
build “community wealth.”287 The desire for community control does not stem 
from a cost-benefit analysis of the most efficient scale for renewable energy 
systems; it stems from a profound distrust between communities of color and 
dominant energy institutions.288 
Energy law scholars have not yet done much work to investigate the ex-
tent to which decentralizing energy decision-making might advance the dual 
aims of community empowerment and decarbonization. Nor have scholars 
thoroughly examined what tools—for example, community choice aggrega-
tion, municipalization efforts, community-owned energy, or targeted efforts at 
net metered rooftop solar—might be most effective at achieving these goals.289 
Moreover, scholars might think about how to link and embed these communi-
ty-level efforts within frameworks proposed at state and federal levels. These 
are all areas where energy law scholars could devote their research skills and 
time to serving a more diverse movement and project—rather than dismissing 
these conversations as a sideshow to the project of industrial decarbonization. 
C. A Deeper Materiality 
The final expansion that energy law needs is to get a whole lot more ma-
terial. Right now, the field mostly concerns itself with Victorian-era units of 
                                                                                                                           
285 See Scott Burger, Jesse D. Jenkins, Samuel C. Huntington & Ignacio J. Pérez-Arriaga, Why 
Distributed?: A Critical Review of the Tradeoffs Between Centralized and Decentralized Resources, 
IEEE POWER & ENERGY MAG., Mar.–Apr. 2019, at 23–24 (weighing the costs and benefits of modern 
energy policy); Severin Borenstein, What Can Distributed Generation Do for the Grid?, ENERGY 
INST. AT HAAS: BLOG (Sept. 28, 2020), https://energyathaas.wordpress.com/2020/09/28/what-can-
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286 See supra notes 259–262 and accompanying text. 
287 Lennon, supra note 188, at 21. 
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energy, such as British thermal units (BTUs), megawatt-hours, and barrels.290 
But some combination of fossil fuels, solar energy, and human labor is embed-
ded in all things produced and consumed.291 That means that large swaths of 
emissions are left unaccounted for if energy law stops tracking its barrels and 
electrons at the point of delivery. It also means that widening income and 
wealth inequality, which beget widening disparities in material consumption, 
create a growing gulf in energy usage between the wealthiest Americans and 
the rest of the country. And this gap is beyond what experts can measure by 
looking at energy expenditures alone. This final subpart urges energy law 
scholars to redefine the field by tracing energy more fully through its con-
sumptive uses in our economy and society. This tracing, in turn, reveals the 
need for a renewed commitment to energy conservation. 
The first expansion needed is sectoral. Existing energy law is all about 
ensuring robust markets in raw energy products. But the activity occurring in 
major sectors beyond the account of energy law creates the most carbon pollu-
tion.292 The lack of scholarly attention to other high-energy sectors is most sur-
prising with respect to transportation, which seems like a natural subject for 
energy law research. Until recently, scholars have largely ignored this oil-
fueled sector because oil law has focused on production, and to a lesser extent, 
pipeline construction and siting challenges as key to ensuring widespread, ac-
cessible supplies.293 Now, however, the end-use side of transportation policy 
looms as a key underexplored conundrum for climate-aware energy law re-
search. The challenges of decarbonizing transportation appear to be far more 
complex and intractable than those of electricity, as they are centered on where 
we work, live, and recreate, and how we navigate among these spaces.294 
A few energy law scholars have made forays into transportation decar-
bonization by considering the ways in which the transportation sector is in-
creasingly overlapping with public utility law through vehicle electrification 
                                                                                                                           
290 See generally CARA NEW DAGGETT, THE BIRTH OF ENERGY: FOSSIL FUELS, THERMODYNAM-
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291 See Lucy Baker, Of Embodied Emissions and Inequality: Rethinking Energy Consumption, 
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efforts.295 But the field could stand to push further into theories of how to best 
manage the energy flows that empower modern mobility, or how to reshape 
that mobility itself. Such research might also highlight the equity impacts of 
decarbonizing transportation. Wealthy people contribute far more transporta-
tion-related emissions, particularly due to frequent airplane flights but also due 
to increased vehicle usage.296 Solutions that address this wealth gap might look 
quite different from the current emphasis on personal vehicle electrification as 
a key policy aim—and might more deeply contend with the roles of public 
transportation, aviation, and shipping in an equitable no-carbon future.297 
Many of the most impactful changes in transportation emissions may also 
come from shifts in what geographer Matt Huber terms the “social production 
of space.”298 To this end, many land use law scholars are already engaged in 
questions of how to reform the regulation of space to respond to climate 
change.299 But here too, energy law scholars have important perspective to of-
fer. Energy and its flows through society are central to the way that spaces are 
designed and constructed—meaning that “new energy systems will also re-
quire new spatialities and new spatial imaginations.”300 Better connecting en-
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ENV’T L. 231, 233–34 (2012) (observing the importance of “land use legal regimes” in tackling de-
carbonization); John R. Nolon, Low Carbon Land Use: Paris, Pittsburgh, and the IPCC, 40 U. ARK. 
LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 661 (2018); John R. Nolon, The Land Use Stabilization Wedge Strategy: Shift-
ing Ground to Mitigate Climate Change, 34 WM. & MARY ENV’T L. & POL’Y REV. 1 (2009); Lee 
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ergy, transportation, and land use law will thus be a critical component of suc-
cessfully decarbonizing these entrenched drivers of emissions.301 
Moreover, much of what must occur to change these spatialities—or in 
lay terms, the built environment—involves funding and executing infrastruc-
ture transformation. Here, scholars steeped in public utility law and energy 
infrastructure siting have many useful lessons and ideas to offer about how to 
build and finance the next generation of transformative infrastructure.302 The 
same might be true as we think creatively about how to induce and fund 
changes in industrial and agricultural fossil fuel consumption, or to productive-
ly and equitably harness agricultural emissions.303 
In sum, energy itself has never stopped at the point of delivery. Energy 
law long has, but only because the material-turned-intellectual goal was secur-
ing abundant fossil fuel resources. As goals shift to include limiting the emis-
sions associated with energy use, intellectual inquiries must as well. We have 
to follow the BTUs, barrels, and electrons all the way to their catastrophic at-
mospheric detritus. 
This full accounting of energy-related emissions must also extend beyond 
U.S. borders. Many modern carbon emissions come in the form of “embodied 
emissions,” or the emissions it takes to make the many consumer goods that 
affluent Western households acquire.304 These emissions are tricky to reduce 
through conventional domestic decarbonization policies, as production pro-
cesses frequently span countries and continents in ways that elude traditional 
accounting mechanisms. U.S. research on this topic is scant, but research based 
in the United Kingdom highlights these difficulties. Political economist Lucy 
Baker finds that although the United Kingdom “has one of the least energy-
intensive economies in the developed world . . . the country has one of the 
highest net imports of emissions in the world and is among the highest in terms 
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of per capita emissions,” predominantly due to embodied emissions.305 Embod-
ied emissions represent a new frontier of climate research and climate policy, 
given that they cannot be tackled through the existing predominant strategies 
of electrifying everything and moving to one-hundred-percent-clean electrici-
ty––unless this is accomplished everywhere on Earth relatively simultaneously. 
This consumption-oriented inquiry is a critical but underdeveloped piece 
of the energy justice concept.306 Energy-overconsuming communities are the 
flip side of the same coin as the communities overburdened by the impacts of 
this consumption. Although most people think of between-country dispersions 
of greenhouse gas emissions as the key problem here––for example, the United 
States as compared to India––researchers have found that “within-country ine-
quality makes up 50% of the global dispersion of CO2e emissions,” making it 
“crucial to focus on high individual emitters rather than high-emitting coun-
tries.”307 This focus becomes more crucial in light of research revealing that 
income inequality in the United States actually drives higher carbon emissions, 
such that policies that reduce income inequality are climate policies them-
selves.308 
Accounting for embodied emissions also has equity implications within 
and beyond the United States. Traditional energy sources have long created 
contentious waste problems, including coal ash and spent nuclear fuel rods, 
with disproportionate, racialized impacts.309 Although superior by comparison, 
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renewable resources and electric vehicles still require significant material in-
puts, some with their own dangerous side effects for local populations in the 
places where they are produced.310 Accordingly, any climate strategy that relies 
on perpetual economic growth powered by renewable energy will leave a host 
of justice-related challenges unaddressed.311 
Policy enthusiasts and academics partially recognize this reality by fre-
quently emphasizing the importance of energy efficiency or, in colloquial 
terms, doing more with less.312 In practical terms, this inclination to conserve 
translates to measures such as LED lightbulbs, better insulation, and improved 
production processes.313 Serious decarbonization plans call for using efficiency 
improvements to cut energy demand by at least 20%, and up to 40%, by 
2050.314 Most of these proposals do not acknowledge, however, that domestic 
improvements in efficiency cannot save us from the challenge of embedded 
energy and likely cannot, on their own, get us far enough down the path to re-
duced energy usage.315 
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This position is an unpopular one. Largescale, mainstream studies of de-
carbonization in the United States often assert that “the impact of deep decar-
bonization on daily life in 2050 is likely to be barely perceptible to most peo-
ple,” because “the day to day interaction of most people with using energy 
goods and services will change very little.”316 But this position is tenable only 
if (1) one is comfortable with the current distribution of energy resources with-
in the United States, and (2) one is willing to ignore the harm this causes be-
yond our borders. If one refuses to make these concessions, then it becomes 
unlikely that Americans could continue affluent Western lifestyles as they cur-
rently exist, aspire to raise all people and countries to developed status, and 
also deliver a sustainable energy system.317 Instead, megawatt-hours will have 
to be distributed more evenly and more parsimoniously to succeed. 
For this reason, it is time to begin to talk seriously again about energy 
conservation, that is, doing less and consuming less. It can be difficult to con-
ceptualize what the role of energy law scholars should be in this conversation, 
focused as it often is on personal morality and psychology. Indeed, energy con-
servation as a policy topic seems to have fallen out of vogue around the time 
that President Jimmy Carter donned an infamous sweater in a poorly received 
White House plea to Americans to use less energy during the Arab Oil Embar-
go.318 But in advocating for more attention to consumption-related emissions, I 
do not intend to embrace this individualized notion of conservation. Instead, I 
join those scholars troubled by the notion that we can or should craft a mes-
sage of individual sacrifice as the cure to our climate woes.319 Unnecessary 
                                                                                                                           
(2017) (gathering energy rebound studies and suggesting that most analyses underestimate the extent 
to which efficiency gains are offset by increased energy consumption in other areas); Steve Sorrell, 
Energy Substitution, Technical Change and Rebound Effects, 7 ENERGIES 2850, 2854 (2014) (ex-
plaining why “energy-augmenting technical change will not lead to a proportionate improvement in 
aggregate energy productivity”). 
316 JAMES H. WILLIAMS, BENJAMIN HALEY & RYAN JONES, ENERGY & ENV’T ECON., INC., DEEP 
DECARBONIZATION PATHWAYS PROJECT, 2 U.S. 2050: POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF DEEP DECARBONI-
ZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 24 (2015), https://usddpp.org/downloads/2015-report-on-policy-
implications.pdf [https://perma.cc/CSS3-WYAJ] (emphasis omitted). 
317 See Brockway et al., supra note 315, at 52 (postulating a “a simple truth: that reducing energy 
demand in the face of rising affluence is a hard task”). 
318 See Examining Carter’s ‘Malaise Speech,’ 30 Years Later, NPR (July 12, 2009), https://www.
npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=106508243 [https://perma.cc/6RUR-77GX] (highlighting 
how Carter “tried to push the energy crisis on to a kind of moral and civic plane” but also describing 
how strong initial positive reactions to the speech quickly caved into a crisis of confidence in the Pres-
ident (internal quotations omitted)). 
 319 For authors that share this message, see LUCIA A. REISCH, CORINNA FISHER, RAINER 
GRIEßHAMMER, VIOLA MUSTER, ULF SCHRADER, CHRISTIAN THORUN & FRANZISKA WOLFF, SUS-
TAINABLE CONSUMPTION NOW! THE GERMAN NATIONAL PROGRAMME FOR SUSTAINABLE CON-
SUMPTION ON THE TEST BED 2 (2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3679773 
[https://perma.cc/87QK-2S8H]; Purdy, supra note 211, at 86–87 (framing the problem as one of insti-
tutions rather than errors in personal preferences); Huber, supra note 23, at 328; Risa Palm, Toby 
 
2402 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:2339 
consumption should not be thought of as a “private affair,”320 but rather as a 
collective, though unequally distributed, affliction. This means the focus 
should be on structural energy conservation—or building social structures and 
infrastructures that empower us to live lower-energy, lower-carbon lives. 
Many potential policy approaches to this empowerment lie within the ex-
panded set of sectors discussed above, including changes to land use patterns, 
zoning laws, transportation options, and aviation regulation. When analyzing 
these sectors, scholars might prioritize efforts to reduce the structural need for 
energy consumption. For example, an emphasis on public transportation over 
individual electric vehicles might not only particularly assist communities of 
color, but also provoke a more effective shift in the structural determinants of 
carbon emissions by inducing denser living.321 
Other components of this agenda are newer. For example, distinguishing 
between luxury-based emissions and needs-driven emissions, and treating the 
two categories differently, may offer one potential policy solution for unequal 
emissions.322 But scholars have devoted limited attention to operationalizing 
this idea. Another possibility is to assign carbon responsibility for embodied 
emissions to certain large, midstream domestic entities, such as the Amazons, 
Walmarts, and Targets of the world, to induce attentiveness to international 
supply chain emissions and the availability, durability, and cost of consumer 
goods.323 
Increased attention to unequal emissions might also counsel for reexamin-
ing the relationships among energy, work, and affluence. Changes such as a 
mandatory four-day or forty-hour work week or universal basic income may 
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solve certain energy-related challenges in addition to social policy concerns.324 
Choosing among these reforms is beyond the purview of energy law and 
should be a matter for democratic contestation at various scales. But energy 
law scholars could help build the energy-related case for structural efforts at 
energy conservation and could pursue case studies of potential promising re-
forms and their challenges. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article’s goal is to push energy law scholarship beyond its twentieth-
century bounds and illustrate why the field cannot continue to succeed within 
the confines of its fossil-fueled past. This piece suggests numerous new path-
ways that energy law scholars should explore to ensure that the field continues 
to improve lives, or at the very least, ceases to imperil them dramatically. It is 
also worth re-emphasizing the ways in which the bounds of our scholarship 
structure the topics we teach to our students. I hope that this Article might in-
spire us to expand not just our writing and thinking, but the materials that we 
present to students as constituting our field of study. Ultimately, our goal 
should be to launch the next generation of climate and energy advocates with 
analytical capacities commensurate with the scale of the climate change chal-
lenge today. They are going to need them. 
                                                                                                                           
324 See DAGGETT, supra note 290, at 158–59 (linking the Victorian effort to valorize “work ethic” 
and denigrate leisure and idleness to the rise of modern energy and capitalism); id. at 190 (“putting 
post-carbon movements into conversation with the post-work political tradition”). 
 
 
 
